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Chapter	  1 Introducing	  E-­‐government	  Project	  Escalation	  as	  
a	  Research	  Topic	  
 
“There is a huge gulf between the rose-tinted hype about information 
technology’s (IT) role in the public sector, and the actual reality. The 
overall result is a massive wastage of financial, human and political 
resources, and an inability to deliver the potential gains from e-
government to its beneficiaries.” 
 
(Heeks, 2006) 
 
 
The	  evolution	  of	  e-­‐government	  
Electronic government or e-government has been one of the more 
important developments in the public sector over the past two 
decades. Definitions for the concept have been numerous and diverse 
with none having been universally accepted  (Yildiz, 2007). Very few 
definitions seem to cover the wide variety of e-government 
applications and the associated gains that these applications offer. In 
broad terms, e-government encompasses all government efforts 
shaped by information and communication technologies (ICT) 
(Brown, 2005). The difficulty of defining e-government may be 
related to the fact that the concept has been evolving since its origins 
along with the underlying rhetoric surrounding its merits. 
 
The earliest applications of e-government were aimed at improving 
the internal functioning of government organisations. Large 
computerised systems were first used as effective and efficient tools 
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for storing and retrieving information (Bretschneider, 1990; Brown, 
2005; Kim, Pan, & Pan, 2007). In this stage of its evolution, e-
government was a “stovepipe” phenomenon. Organisational 
boundaries were rarely crossed in order to share information with 
other government agencies, let alone citizens or businesses (Aldrich, 
Bertot, & McClure, 2002). 
 
In the 1990’s microcomputing evolved and opened new possibilities 
that crossed organisational boundaries. For example, the development 
of floppy disks and CD-ROM’s containing small collections of 
government data created the potential to distribute information and 
digital services to citizens and businesses. However, it was the 
development and growth of the Internet that yielded the real 
breakthrough in digital delivery of government information and 
services. The Internet created possibilities for almost unlimited 
information provision, two-way communication, and direct external 
access to government databases (Aldrich, Bertot, & McClure, 2002; 
Brown, 2005). With the arrival of the Internet, the concept of e-
government was no longer restricted to increasing the operational 
efficiency and effectiveness of government by using computerised 
systems. It now involved the use of a much wider array of ICT’s that 
allowed government agencies to share information with other 
agencies, provide convenient access to public information, and 
efficiently service citizens and businesses (Ahn & Bretschneider, 
2011; Asgarkhani, 2005; Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005; Kim, Kim, & 
Lee, 2009; Nour, AbdelRahman, & Fadlalla, 2008). 
 
In recent years, public awareness concerning the potential benefits of 
e-government has grown, creating heightened expectations. These 
growing expectations are partly fuelled by advances in web-based 
services in the private sector. Consequently, e-government is expected 
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to continue evolving (Asgarkhani, 2005; Brown, 2005). While simply 
cataloguing information was sufficient in the early stages of e-
government development, governments are now working toward 
solutions that allow completely digital transactions and, eventually, 
fully integrated one-stop shopping for government services by citizens 
and businesses (Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005; Layne & Lee, 2001; 
Moon, 2002). Recent e-government promises are also suggestive of a 
wider and more meaningful array of potential gains such as enhanced 
economic development, increased government accountability and 
transparency, higher levels of democracy and citizen involvement, 
and the potential to reshape communities (Ahn & Bretschneider, 
2011; Bekkers & Homburg, 2007; Edmiston, 2003; Jaeger, 2003; Kim 
& Kim, 2003). 
 
The evolution of e-government has not occurred in a vacuum. It is the 
product of three broader evolutionary processes in society and public 
administration (Brown, 2005). First, technological evolution, with 
developments in computer technology and the World Wide Web 
being particularly prominent, has fundamentally changed societal 
norms and methods of communication and information dissemination. 
The use of these technologies has become an integral part of our daily 
lives and governments have not been exempt (Asgarkhani, 2005; 
Brown, 2005; Lee & Kim, 2007; Gonzalez, Gasco, & Llopis, 2007). 
 
Second, there has been an evolution in management thinking which 
has increasingly emphasised organisational efficiency, empowerment 
of employees and citizens, and a focus on results. Evolutions in 
management thinking have been imported from the private sector into 
the public sector. These include the use of benchmarking and best 
practices in information management that are heavily supported by the 
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capabilities of information technology (Cordella & Ianacci, 2010; 
Brown, 2005; Gonzalez, Gasco, & Llopis, 2007; Yildiz, 2007). 
 
Third and finally, the role of government itself has evolved. A new 
paradigm has emerged in which governments are expected to be 
service oriented and treat citizens as empowered customers (Bekkers 
& Homburg, 2007). Within this paradigm, information technology is 
an indispensable resource (Asgarkhani, 2005; Edmiston, 2003; Jaeger, 
2003; Kim & Kim, 2003; Layne & Lee, 2001). 
 
As e-government evolves, it has become apparent that its impact on 
government and society distinguishes it from applications of ICT in 
the private sector. For example, several scholars have claimed that e-
government has changed the way that critical information is 
distributed among stakeholders, thereby shifting the balance of power 
and fundamentally altering relationships between policy makers, 
government institutions, and the public (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011; 
Brown, 2005; Rose & Grant, 2010). The implementation of e-
government also drives institutional and organisational change within 
governments, making it distinct from other types of public projects. 
With the rise of e-government, information and technology have 
become key resources in governmental organisations and this has 
necessitated the introduction of legislation, policies, and institutions to 
ensure the quality, integrity, and security of these resources (Brown, 
2005; Gascó, 2003; Moon, 2002). Furthermore, the growing 
importance of information and technology is changing the roles and 
activities within governmental organisations, requiring different 
capabilities, knowledge, and organisational structures (Beynon-
Davies, 2005; Brown, 2005).  
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The	  problems	  facing	  e-­‐government	  implementation	  
While e-government has had intuitive appeal, several studies have 
shown that the actual implementation of e-government has been 
fraught with difficulties (Bekkers & Homburg, 2007; Layne & Lee, 
2001). Dominant theory suggests that the implementation and 
effectiveness of e-government initiatives are shaped by a complex 
interaction between technology, political agendas, organisational 
characteristics and institutional arrangements (Cordella & Ianacci, 
2010; Fountain, 2001). However, most projects aimed to create the 
required technology for e-government fail to deliver, and thus never 
get implemented to prove their effectiveness. 
 
IT projects, both private and public, are generally noted for their high 
incidence of problematic realisation owing to the inherent complexity 
and uncertainty associated with these projects in conjunction with 
their need to integrate requirements and knowledge from multiple, 
often opposing stakeholders (Cerpa & Verner, 2009; Mähring & Keil, 
2008; Pan, Pan, & Flynn, 2004). According to the 2012 CHAOS 
report by the Standish Group, only 39% of all IT projects are 
completed successfully whereas 43% of IT projects are seen as 
problematic and 18% are regarded as complete failures (The Standish 
Group, 2012). 
 
Compounding the problems with IT projects in general, e-government 
implementations can be seen as an even more complex and uncertain 
category of IT projects, because of the distinct environment in which 
they are enacted. When compared to the private sector, IT projects in 
the public sector need to cope with a broader array of accountabilities 
and stakeholders, weaker human and technological infrastructure, and 
greater politicisation of processes (Heeks, 2006; Heintze & 
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Bretschneider, 2000). The political environment can also impose 
shorter time frames on work, stronger accountability measures, and 
tasks that are undertaken under sometimes-intense public scrutiny 
(Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1986). 
 
Despite their additional challenges, e-government projects tend to be 
much larger than IT projects in the private sector. Research in the 
Netherlands suggests that while 100 large private sector organisations 
spent 1,7 billion euros on approximately 6000 projects within a given 
timeframe, the state government had spent 4,2 billion euros on 73 
projects (Verhoef, 2008). As IT projects tend to be larger in the public 
sector, their failure results in large-scale waste of financial, human 
and political resources (Heeks R. , 2006; Kromann Kristensen & 
Bühler, 2001).  
 
 
Understanding	  e-­‐government	  project	  failure	  
There are many ways to define failure in e-government projects. 
Commonly used definitions are projects that are late, over budget, 
delivering less than the required features or functions, being 
completed but not used, or being cancelled prior to completion 
(Algemene Rekenkamer, 2007; The Standish Group, 2012). However, 
such definitions have resulted in struggles to understand and prevent 
failure in e-government projects. Given the wide array of challenges, 
e-governments projects are complex and relatively unpredictable 
undertakings that rarely result in exactly the predefined and required 
result within exactly the predefined schedule and budget. As per 
earlier definitions, this implies that almost all would be considered 
failures. For example, to prevent budget overruns, it may be advisable 
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to withdraw some features or functions, or even cancel the project in 
an early stage. 
 
What has also limited the understanding of e-government project 
failure is that most studies thus far have been factor-oriented, focusing 
on explaining variance in outcomes on the basis of a set of success or 
failure factors (Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005; Guah, 2008; Keil M. , 
1995a; Gonzalez, Gasco, & Llopis, 2007). The limitation of such 
research is that while it can uncover relationships between factors and 
outcomes, it provides little understanding of the process through 
which the outcomes arise and the complexity of the causal 
relationships between factors and outcomes. As a result, the processes 
within e-government projects largely remain black boxed in these 
studies, leaving public sector managers under- equipped to take the 
proactive steps needed to prevent failure of e-government projects  
(Yildiz, 2007). 
 
This study aims to elicit a richer understanding of failing e-
government projects. To do this, it applies a broader definition of e-
government project success. Besides the uncommon delivery 
according to plan, this research also considers timely adaptation to 
unforeseen problems to be successes in e-government projects. Such 
adaptation could imply adjusting the course of action to ensure that 
the project will still deliver the intended value with reasonable costs, 
or cancelling the project with minimal financial damage. Failure is 
thus a process wherein the course of action of a project remains 
largely unchanged despite of the fact that the project is not delivering 
on intended results. This particular process is known as project 
escalation and has been defined as a situation where decision makers 
continue to invest additional resources into a project, despite negative 
feedback surrounding the project’s ability to deliver its intended 
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results (Brockner J. , 1992; Staw & Ross, 1987) Project escalation 
explains how some e-government projects can seemingly take ‘a life 
of their own’, running indefinitely without reaching their objectives 
while continuing to consume valuable resources (Keil M. , 1995a). 
When such a project is finally abandoned or seriously redirected, it 
already represents a massive resource waste.  
 
Unlike the majority of existing research on project failure, this study 
takes a process-oriented approach to focus on project escalation. In 
contrast to factor-oriented research, process-oriented research seeks to 
explore the sequence of circumstances, choices and events that lead to 
the outcome of interest (Mohr, 1982). As such, this type of research 
has the ability to provide insights into the complex dynamics of e-
government projects and help government decision makers to ensure 
the realisation of targeted goals, thereby minimising the loss of public 
funds on ineffective investments (Yildiz, 2007). 
 
	  
Research	  questions	  
This research aims to provide a better understanding of the project 
escalation process in the e-government context as it is desirable to 
avoid repeating previous errors and the associated wastage of public 
resources. It should be understood that this is thus not a study of e-
government, but a study of project escalation in the e-government 
context. This answers the call for contextually based research to 
understand how organisations are drawn into losing courses of action 
and how they may be able to extricate themselves from these 
predicaments (Ross & Staw, 1993). The proneness to escalation of 
projects in the e-government context makes it specifically interesting 
and valuable to obtain a better understanding of the associated 
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process. Therefore, the main research question underlying this thesis 
is: 
 
Ø How does the process of e-government project escalation unfold? 
 
Sub-questions that will be addressed are: 
 
1. What contingencies within e-government projects drive the 
emergence of project escalation over the course of the escalation 
process? 
 
2. How do such contingencies differ in escalated and non-escalated 
e-government projects? 
 
3. What practices diminish the likelihood of e-government project 
escalation? 
 
4. How can project escalation be exited (de-escalation) in a highly 
politicised environment? 
 
 
Dissertation	  outline	  
This dissertation has five chapters, including this introductory chapter, 
covering six different cases of e-government projects.  
 
Chapter 2 sets out a theoretical framework for e-government project 
escalation. This theoretical framework and related propositions were 
used for the study of five cases of e-government projects. This study 
of multiple cases involved analysis and comparison of escalated and 
non-escalated projects. The analysis of these cases was aimed at 
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understanding the process of escalation in e-government projects and 
what contingencies drive the emergence of escalation. As such, 
chapter 2 addresses sub-questions 1 and 2 of this dissertation. 
 
In chapter 3, an e-government project is the subject of an in-depth 
case study to understand how this project circumvented the 
contingencies that drive escalation. This inquiry provided important 
insights into practices that diminish the likelihood of e-government 
project escalation while reaffirming the validity of the findings in 
chapter 2. It therefore deals with sub-question 3 of the dissertation. 
 
Exiting project escalation in a highly politicised environment is the 
subject of chapter 4. As such, this chapter addresses sub-question 4 of 
the dissertation, which is of particular importance to e-government 
projects. An in-depth study of a critical case was undertaken to verify 
and extend current theory on de-escalation. 
 
In chapter 5, the findings of the thesis are discussed with the aim of 
advancing existing theory on e-government implementation through 
insights into the process of e-government project escalation providing 
by the present work. Also, practical implications of the study are 
offered and elaborated upon in relation to how practitioners can 
prevent or exit e-government project escalation. Finally, discussing its 
limitations and setting out recommendations for further research 
concludes the dissertation. 
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Chapter	  2 The	  Perfect	  Storm:	  Contingencies	  Driving	  the	  
Process	  of	  E-­‐government	  Project	  Escalation	  
 
“The complex dynamics within e-government projects largely remain 
a black box in the current literature.”  
 
(Yildiz, 2007) 
 
 
Introduction	  
The implementation of e-government has not been without its 
challenges (Bekkers & Homburg, 2007; Layne & Lee, 2001). In 
particular, e-government projects frequently continue unchanged 
despite clear feedback that they are not delivering their intended 
results, all the while consuming more and more valuable resources. 
Investigation of the nature of the process of e-government project 
escalation has, however, attracted limited research attention (Yildiz, 
2007). Better understanding of the e-government project escalation 
process can guide future research and equip practitioners to forestall 
and proactively address project escalation. 
 
The emergence of e-government project escalation seems to be 
contingent on a wide variety of circumstances and events. In fact, it 
has been widely recognised that e-government development exhibits 
aspects of complex systems in which it is typically very difficult to 
predict or explain the course of events (Goldfinch, 2007; Keil, Rai, 
Mann, & Cheney Zhang, 2003; Cerpa & Verner, 2009). More 
specifically, the escalation process itself has been identified as a 
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complex process that is influenced by many different contingencies 
(Keil M. , 1995a; Pan, Pan, & Newman, 2009; Pan G. , Pan, Newman, 
& Flynn, 2006).  
 
Henceforth, it seems to be relevant to apply both a process and 
contingency oriented approach to improve understanding of e-
government project escalation. The addressed research questions in 
this chapter are therefore: 
 
1. What contingencies within e-government projects drive the 
emergence of project escalation over the course of the escalation 
process? 
 
2. How do such contingencies differ in escalated and non-escalated 
e-government projects? 
 
To be able to address the research questions, two theoretical 
perspectives are brought together in one framework for this study. The 
next section elaborates on this. 
 
 
Theory	  
Escalation theory  
 
Project escalation is a concept that stems from escalation theory. 
Escalation theory refers to the tendency for decision makers to persist 
in failing courses of action, manifested through continued investment, 
even beyond the point where benefits equal costs (Bowen, 1987; Staw 
& Ross, 1987). It is a phenomenon that is identified in different fields, 
such as organisational behaviour, strategic management and 
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psychology as well as in different contexts, such as military 
interventions, research and development, and IT projects (Bowen, 
1987; Brockner J. , 1992; Guah, 2008; Keil M. , 1995a; Mähring & 
Keil, 2008; Pan, Pan, & Flynn, 2004).  
 
Project escalation is escalation of commitment within the specific 
setting of projects. Early studies on the subject led to theorisation on 
simple process models, during which different determinants 
influenced the tendency to either continue the course of action or 
withdraw from it. For example, it was suggested that project 
escalation is a process in which increasingly negative feedback on 
outcomes is received but the course of action is pursued nonetheless 
due to project, psychological, social and/or organisational 
determinants (Staw & Ross, 1987). Based on one particular case 
study, it was proposed that organisational determinants are most 
salient in the early phase of the escalation process, while 
psychological and social determinants were salient in the beginning 
and middle phases, and project determinants in the beginning and late 
phase (Ross & Staw, 1993). Moreover, contextual determinants were 
identified as being salient toward the final phases of the process. 
 
Later work on project escalation has contributed a more sophisticated 
model, characterizing it as a process that gradually unfolds over time 
in three distinct phases: drift, unsuccessful incremental adaptation, 
and rationalised continuation (Mähring & Keil, 2008) (see Figure 1). 
Escalation theory has thus remained consistent in its process 
orientation. However, this view is currently underrepresented in the 
research on e-government project failure (Yildiz, 2007). 
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Figure 1 – Project escalation process model (Source: Mähring & Keil, 2008) 
 
Contingency theory 
 
Contingency theory posits that there is no single best decision or way 
to organise. Depending on contingencies in the internal or external 
environment, the outcomes of certain decisions or organisational 
approaches may vary greatly (Galbraith, 1973).  
 
Building on contingency theory, two e-government projects can be 
organised and directed in the exact same manner but have completely 
different outcomes. The specific fit between the project and 
circumstances and events in the internal and external environment of 
the project determine whether the project is effective or not, but also 
whether it escalates or not when it is not effective.  
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Theoretical	  framework	  
To understand the process of e-government project escalation, this 
study integrates elements of escalation theory and contingency theory. 
The subsequent theoretical framework is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Based on the definition of escalation of commitment, the first 
proposition underlying the theoretical framework is that e-government 
project escalation is contingent upon the combination of two 
conditions: there is a failing course of action, and there is commitment 
to this course of action (Staw & Ross, 1987). That is, if there is an 
ineffective course of action but little or no commitment to it, project 
escalation is unlikely to happen as decision-makers will terminate or 
redirect the project as soon as negative feedback reaches them. 
Conversely, if there is commitment to the course of action but this 
course of action is effective, project escalation is not likely either. 
 
The second proposition is that the effectiveness of a project’s course 
of action will in turn be contingent upon the salience of certain events 
and circumstances in the internal or external environment of the 
project. An ineffective or failing course of action is considered to be a 
course of action that does not deliver on the intended results within 
the intended timeframe. These contingencies are not yet well defined 
and are therefore part of the first focal point of this study; uncovering 
the contingencies that drive the e-government project escalation 
process. 
 
The third and final propositions are also part of the first focal point. 
The presence of commitment to the course of action in an e-
government project will also be dependent on yet unidentified 
contingencies. The taxonomy of determinants of Staw and Ross 
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(1987) has already shed some light on what promotes commitment 
over the course of the project escalation process. However, there is 
room to further existing knowledge. First, although some specific 
examples were given, the categories of the aforementioned taxonomy 
have been posited at a rather high level of abstraction. Second, the 
process model has not yet been developed to incorporate the higher 
level of detail about different phases that later studies have brought 
forward (Mähring & Keil, 2008). Third, existing theory has not yet 
been extensively validated in or enriched for the context of e-
government projects though it has been recognized that contextually 
based research is needed to further understand the project escalation 
process (Ross & Staw, 1993). 
 
 
Figure 2 – Theoretical framework for project escalation 
 
Consistent with existing theory, contingencies for the level of 
effectiveness of a course of action and the level of commitment are 
considered to be dynamic over the course of a project. Therefore, the 
second focal point of this study is to understand how commitment and 
effectiveness unfold in different phases of that process. 
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As there are many potential contingencies that may matter in the 
process of e-government project escalation, an extensive and 
systematic literature review was done. This review focussed on 
identifying relevant contingencies for project effectiveness in the 
existing research literature. Metaphors and concepts used to describe 
such contingencies in existing e-government or information systems 
studies were investigated and contrasted to synthesise the findings of 
prior work.  
 
Relevant studies for the systematic review were located and collected 
through conventional and reference-based searches of twelve relevant 
electronic databases. To ensure data quality, the study only searched 
articles published in peer-reviewed academic journals. Search criteria, 
search terms, and databases used are listed in Table 1. The top 500 
articles identified through these searches were initially selected for 
relevance based on title (105) and subsequently on abstract (73). 
Reading the full article to identify articles that explicitly listed 
contingencies affecting the success, failure, and/or effectiveness of IT 
projects did final article selection. Contingencies in this case were 
defined and identified as future events or circumstances, which are 
possible but cannot be predicted with certainty. As such, practices 
like poor project management or low business involvement were not 
considered as contingencies.  
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Databases and search 
engines used 
Ø EBSCO Business Source Premier 
Ø Emerald 
Ø Google Scholar 
Ø JSTOR 
Ø Oxford Journals 
Ø SAGE Journals 
Ø ScienceDirect (Elsevier) 
Ø Taylor & Francis Online 
Ø Wiley Online Library 
Search criteria for 
contingencies driving 
project ineffectiveness 
Ø Academic, peer-reviewed journals 
Ø Full text 
Ø ‘IT project failure’ 
Ø ‘Information Technology project failure’ 
Ø ‘IT project success’ 
Ø ‘Information Technology project success’ 
Ø ‘IT project effectiveness’ 
Ø ‘Information Technology project 
effectiveness’ 
Ø ‘Public IT projects’ 
Ø ‘Information Technology projects’ 
Ø ‘Managing e-government projects’ 
Ø ‘E-government implementation’ 
Ø ‘E-government initiative’ 
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Search criteria for 
contingencies driving 
commitment to a 
failing course of action 
Ø Academic, peer-reviewed journals 
Ø Full text 
Ø ‘Escalation of commitment’ 
Ø ‘Project escalation’ 
 
Table 1 – Databases and search criteria 
 
This selection strategy resulted in the identification of 22 relevant 
articles. The contingencies described in these articles were analysed 
and synthesised. If any of the contingencies did not fit the categories 
of the taxonomy, an appropriate category was added. The systematic 
review eventually resulted in five contingencies that potentially 
contributing to the ineffectiveness of the course of action taken by e-
government projects. 
 
Technical complexity 
 
One of the most frequently mentioned 
contingencies related to IT	   project effectiveness is 
technical complexity. Many IT projects involve 
technically complexities such as compatibility and 
synchronisation issues between different systems. 
Unaccounted difficulties in this area may lead the project to be less 
effective than anticipated. Also, technical complexity may imply that 
it is not always entirely evident beforehand how the required 
functionality should be made, especially when new and unfamiliar 
technology is used. 
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References in the literature 
Ø Difficulties with the integration of different information systems 
(Bekkers & Homburg, 2007)  
Ø Difficulties experienced in relation to technical implementation 
(Beynon-Davies, 2005) 
Ø Introduction of new technology (Cule, Schmidt, Lyytinen, & Keil, 2000) 
Ø Technical barriers (Dawes, 1996) 
Ø Technology incompatibility, issues with the newness of technology (Gil-
Garcia & Pardo, 2005) 
Ø Effects of technical factors (Hairul, Nasir, & Sahibuddin, 2011) 
Ø Difficulties with technical synchronisation of systems (Lee & Kim, 
2007) 
Ø Technical failure (Luna-Reyes, Zhang, Gil-García, & Cresswell, 2005) 
Ø Issues with integration and interoperation (Scholl & Klischewski, 2007)  
Ø Information technology challenges (Tsai, Choi, & Perry, 2009) 
Ø Content driven issues (Yeo, 2002) 
 
 
Problems of adoption 
 
Ineffective realisation of an e-government project 
may also be contingent on lack of acceptance by the 
user organisation of the resulting system. Problems 
of adoption are forms of rejection or resistance 
toward the outcomes of the e-government project, necessitating more 
development and adaptation before the system can be successfully 
implemented in the target organisation. 
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References in the literature 
Ø Effects of existing frames of reference, power relations, and positions 
within a policy sector (Bekkers & Homburg, 2007)  
Ø Political barriers (Dawes, 1996) 
Ø Issues with governmental actors' job responsibilities and their 
information and communication patterns (Doty & Erdelez, 2002) 
Ø Resistance to change (Edmiston, 2003)  
Ø Issues with dominant professional frameworks (Dawes, 1996)  
Ø Effects of environmental factors (Hairul, Nasir, & Sahibuddin, 2011) 
Ø Effects of social and organisational factors (Luna-Reyes, Zhang, Gil-
García, & Cresswell, 2005) 
Ø Context driven issues (Yeo, 2002) 
 
 
Conflict between stakeholders 
 
Conflict between stakeholders is often mentioned as 
a contingency that affects the effectiveness of IT 
projects. Conflicting interests may lead to 
disagreement over requirements, and subsequent 
lack of clear direction for the project team. This 
may happen between different organisations or different departments 
within the same organisation that have interests in the project. 
 
References in the literature  
Ø Different stakeholder perspectives (Azad & Faraj, 2008) 
Ø Tempered effectiveness by the number of partners involved (Brown, 
O'Toole, & Brudney, 1998) 
Ø Disagreement among multiple departments on project specifications 
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(Cats-Baril & Thompson, 1995)  
Ø Issues caused by organisational self-interest (Dawes, 1996) 
Ø Challenges from the involvement of multiple organisations (Fedorowicz, 
Gogan, & Williams, 2007) 
Ø Effects of political interaction of stakeholders (Heeks & Stanforth, 2007) 
 
 
Problems of coordination and communication 
 
E-government projects are often organisationally 
complex endeavours that span multiple 
organisations or organisational departments. An 
ineffective course of action may therefore be 
contingent on problems that arise from 
coordinating and communicating across this organisational 
complexity.  
 
References in the literature 
Ø Coordination and cooperation problems across backoffices (Bekkers & 
Homburg, 2007)  
Ø Problems of agency and information (Goldfinch, 2007) 
Ø Effects of communication, organisational, and team factors (Hairul, 
Nasir, & Sahibuddin, 2011) 
Ø Organisational and managerial challenges (Tsai, Choi, & Perry, 2009) 
Ø Process driven issues (Yeo, 2002) 
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Changing or new requirements 
 
Changing or introducing new requirements during 
an e-government project may increase the 
development time and lead to ineffectiveness. In the 
case e-government projects, changes that are 
evoked by changes in the organisational, political, 
and/or legal environment have been mentioned as relevant 
contingencies in this respect. 
 
References in the literature 
Ø Customers / users having unrealistic expectations, scope changed during 
the project (Cerpa & Verner, 2009)  
Ø A climate of change in the business and organisational environment that 
creates instability in the project, new or unfamiliar subject matter for 
both users and developers, misunderstanding the requirements (Cule, 
Schmidt, Lyytinen, & Keil, 2000)  
Ø Effects of policy agendas and politics (Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005) 
Ø Lack of alignment between organisational goals and the ICT project 
(Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005) 
Ø  Changes in design specifications late in the project (Yeo, 2002) 
 
The same systematic review was done to identify potentially relevant 
contingencies for commitment to the course of action. The systematic 
literature review focused in this case on the escalation literature. 
Articles were searched in the databases and with the search criteria 
listed in Table 1. The top 500 articles returned through these searches 
were initially selected for relevance based on title (93) and 
subsequently on abstract (20). Reading the full article resulted in a 
final set of nine articles that explicitly listed contingencies driving the 
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level of commitment to a failing course of action in projects or other 
settings. Synthesizing the findings of these studies resulted in the 
identification of six different contingencies that are potentially 
relevant as drivers of commitment to a failing course of action.  
 
Sunk-cost effect 
 
Sunk costs are costs that have been incurred and 
cannot be recovered. Sunk costs should thus be 
ignored in decision-making, as the only costs 
relevant for decisions are those that can be 
avoided (Frank & Bernanke, 2001). However, it 
has been recognised that decision makers often fail to ignore sunk 
costs in making subsequent decisions, and this phenomenon thus 
forms a contingency that drives commitment to a course of action. 
 
References in the literature 
Ø The effects of sunk costs (Keil, 1995b) 
Ø Sunk cost (Lee, Keil, & Kasi, 2012) 
Ø Trying to recoup sunk costs (Ross & Staw, 1993) 
 
 
Completion effect 
 
Commitment to a course of action by decision 
makers may also be contingent on what has been 
referred to as the completion effect. This effect 
holds that decision makers escalate their 
commitment as they draw closer to finishing a 
project because they do not want to give up when successful 
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completion appears close at hand. In many cases the completion effect 
is based on a mistaken belief that a project is closer to completion 
than is actually the case. 
 
References in the literature 
Ø The effects of project completion (Keil, 1995b) 
 
 
Self-justification 
 
Self-justification suggests that escalation of 
commitment may be contingent upon a tendency of 
key decision makers to justify prior investment 
decisions with regard to the course of action. This 
would be driven by self-interest, such as avoiding the negative impact 
that turning back previous decisions would have on professional 
careers. 
 
References in the literature 
Ø Self-justification (Brockner J. , 1992) 
Ø Self-justification behavior (Guah, 2008) 
Ø Self-justification behavior (Keil M. , 1995a) 
Ø The need for self-justification (Ross & Staw, 1993) 
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Information asymmetry 
 
Information asymmetry is a potential contingency in 
projects with a principle-agent structure, as is the 
case with most major e-government projects. This 
structure involves a ‘principal’ who hires the 
services of an ‘agent’ to carry out actions on the 
principal’s behalf. In such a structure, the project executive (principal) 
is dependent upon the information provided by the project 
organisation (agent) to govern the project. This provides a potential 
information asymmetry that can undermine the accuracy of the 
feedback provided to the principal to assess the performance of the 
agent. Such an information asymmetry can be the result of deliberate 
or non-deliberate action of agents depending upon their interests. Due 
to information asymmetry, a decision maker may be committed to a 
course of action without being aware that the course of action is 
failing. 
 
References in the literature 
Ø Information asymmetry (Keil, Rai, Mann, & Cheney Zhang, 2003) 
Ø Slanting of information (Ross & Staw, 1993) 
 
 
Optimism and risk-seeking biases 
 
Prospect theory holds that decision makers are risk-
seeking in relation to financial losses (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). In the case of e-government 
projects, this risk-seeking bias forms a contingency 
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that potentially drives commitment to the course of action. Decision 
makers tend to continue and risk larger losses rather than terminate a 
project and accept a certain but probably smaller loss now.  
 
Closely related, commitment to a course of action may also be 
contingent upon an optimism bias. This bias leads decision makers to 
pursue initiatives, even though they are unlikely to succeed, because 
they are overconfident that a positive outcome can be achieved. 
 
References in the literature 
Ø Loss aversion / individuals will be risk seeking (Brockner J. , 1992) 
Ø Risk seeking behavior (Guah, 2008) 
Ø Optimism (Keil M. , 1995a) 
Ø The propensity to increase risk-seeking behavior when faced with a 
certain loss (Mähring & Keil, 2008) 
Ø Delusional optimism (Pan, Pan, & Flynn, 2004) 
 
 
Social and political pressures 
 
Social and political pressures seem to be especially 
relevant contingencies for commitment in e-
government projects, as these projects are part of 
the public and political domain. Escalation of 
commitment can thus be contingent upon social or 
political pressures to sustain a course of action. Examples are political 
leaders using their authoritative power to follow through, or social 
norms that dictate a need for consistency. 
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References in the literature 
Ø Projects are more prone to escalation when there is strong political 
support at the senior management level and when the project has become 
institutionalised (Keil M. , 1995a)  
Ø Competitive rivalry with other social groups (Ross & Staw, 1993) 
Ø Need for external justification (Ross & Staw, 1993) 
Ø Social norms for consistency (Ross & Staw, 1993) 
 
 
Method	  
Data collection 
 
Case study research was conducted across three cases of escalated e-
government projects, and two cases of e-government projects that 
suffered from an ineffective course of action, but did not escalate, due 
to timely re-direction or termination. This research thus involves an 
analysis and comparison of contingencies between two sets of cases to 
assess the plausibility of the theoretical framework and generate 
theoretical propositions on what contingencies drive ineffectiveness 
and commitment over the course of the escalation process.  
 
Cases for the study were selected using purposive sampling. As a 
result this sampling method did not aimed to ensure 
representativeness but rather the specific relevance to the subject of 
research. First, representative cases of escalated e-government 
projects had to be found. These cases had to be finished projects to 
ensure that they had completed the entire process under examination. 
An expert panel of IT governance advisors employed by different 
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ministries were asked to assess the selection criteria for the purposive 
sample and help select appropriate cases accordingly. As such, the 
purposive sampling method of choice was expert sampling. This 
approach offered two important benefits. First, the researcher was able 
to rely on the insider knowledge of the expert panel to select e-
government projects that were indeed cases of project escalation.  
Second, because e-government project escalation is a sensitive 
subject, informants of the selected projects were approached through 
referrals of the experts in the panel, to increase the level of trust. This 
was undertaken by an introductory e-mail from the expert, before the 
researcher engaged the informants. 
 
The selection criteria for the escalated cases was as follows: 
 
1. The initial course of action did not lead to attainment of the 
project’s objectives (ineffective course of action). 
 
2. The project was terminated without result or with partial result, or 
it was re-directed and completed after it had consumed more than 
150 percent of the initial budget. 
 
Second, using the same purposive sampling procedure, cases of non-
escalated e-government projects were selected. This was necessary for 
the analytical strategy of pattern matching as described earlier. By 
contrasting the patterns observed in escalated cases with the patterns 
in non-escalated projects, inferences could be made about the 
plausibility of the theoretical framework. The selection criteria for 
non-escalated comparison cases were: 
 
1. The initial course of action did not lead to attainment of the 
project’s objectives (ineffective course of action). 
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2. The project was terminated without result or with partial result 
before it had consumed the initial budget, or it was re-directed and 
completed before it had consumed more than 150 percent of the 
initial budget. 
 
From the selected cases and comparison cases, multiple sources of 
evidence were collected. First, key informants within these projects 
were identified and interviewed. Selecting participants that are known 
to have participated in a specific situation and interviewing on the 
basis of a provisional analysis is known as elite interviewing (Kezar, 
2003). Second, documentary evidence was collected from multiple 
sources, which included internal reports, external reviews, 
parliamentary documents, and press articles for each case. An 
overview of the total amount of data collected is shown in Table 2. 
 
Case Interview count 
(total hours) 
Document count 
(total pages) 
Project D 3 (4,5 h.) 10 (81 p.) 
Project S 4 (7 h.) 14 (73 p.) 
Project T 3 (4 h.) 6 (18 p.) 
Project Q 3 (3,5 h.) 5 (43 p.) 
Project P 4 (3 h.) 3 (48 p.) 
Total 17 (22 h.) 38 (263 p.) 
 
Table 2 – Data collected 
 
Key informants within the cases of the study were identified on the 
basis of the researcher’s general knowledge of e-government 
organisations and the expert panel’s specific knowledge of the 
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projects. The positional criteria were that of (former) project 
executive, project manager or senior project staff members within the 
project of interest. The sample was broadened through referral 
sampling. This means that the initial interviewees were asked to 
suggest other knowledgeable informants from the project. The 
researcher nonetheless ensured that the referrals remained in the 
boundaries of relevance to the study by first having an informal 
meeting with these referrals. 
 
The key informants were interviewed through semi-structured and 
elaborate interviews of 1,5 hours on average. Semi-structured 
interviews use an incomplete interview script to allow for free 
conversation and improvisation based on the informant’s answers 
(Myers & Newman, 2007; Weiss, 1995). This type of interviewing 
was deemed suitable, as the aim of the study was to explore informant 
perceptions of the process and causal relationships. The interview 
should therefore be flexible enough to allow for the emergence of 
multiple explanations and pursuit of any direction that informants 
deem relevant. The number of questions was minimised, while still 
reflecting the complete theoretical framework, to ensure the openness, 
flexibility, and improvisation that are required for semi-structured 
interviewing (Myers & Newman, 2007). The interview guide is shown 
in Appendix 1. The interviews were recorded and subsequently 
transcribed (McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 2003).  
 
One of the strengths of interviewing is the possibility to obtain 
accounts from direct witnesses, which can be probed beyond official 
accounts. Interviewing thus provides a particular advantage over 
methods that merely use documents that often only represent an 
official version of the events (Tansey, 2007). Especially in politically 
sensitive processes such as e-government project escalation, this 
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advantage is significant. However, an important limitation of 
interviewing in the context of this research is that it is done 
retrospectively and thus relies on informants’ recollection of the 
investigated processes.  
 
Two measures were taken to ensure the validity of informant 
accounts. First, during the interviews the informants were asked to 
state the dates of the events that they described and this was 
subsequently used to construct a timeline. In this way it was possible 
to verify whether the chronological order of events matched the logic 
of the process. Second, triangulation of accounts between multiple 
informants and different sources of evidence was used to ensure 
consistency and thus validity. This is known as converging lines of 
inquiry and increases reliability and accuracy of the case evidence 
(Yin, 2009). 
 
Analysis 
 
The study relies on a combination of theoretical propositions and the 
development of case descriptions as a general analytical strategy for 
research to arrive at its objectives (Yin, 2009). In terms of 
investigating theoretical propositions for validity, an analytical 
technique known as pattern matching was used. Pattern matching 
relies on the matching of an expected pattern, in this case the process 
model and theoretical framework, with observed patterns, in this case 
the data from the cases. 
 
In terms of developing case descriptions, this study also applies the 
analytical technique of explanation building. This means that the data 
was not only used to validate pre-determined theoretical propositions, 
but also to derive new theory from the data, in this case with regard to 
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the role of specific contingencies over the course of the escalation 
process. That is, the goal of this procedure was to generate new 
theoretical propositions as an extension of the theoretical framework.  
 
To arrive at theoretical propositions, the case data was analysed on the 
salience of contingencies driving either ineffectiveness of the course 
of action or commitment in the escalation process. To this end, the 
data was matched and coded to the previously defined contingencies 
from the systematic literature review. This was done by predefining 
the codes in a coding tool, loading all the interview transcripts and 
collected documents into that same tool, and marking the parts of the 
data where matches were found with the predefined codes. After that, 
the data that matched certain codes could easily be aggregated and 
analysed for consistency across the data set. 
 
Subsequent analysis was to plot both the escalation phases and 
emergence of salient contingencies on the escalation process to create 
an enriched process model for e-government project escalation. This 
was done by matching the chronology of events in the project 
escalation process which were captured in a timeline, with the 
definitions of the escalation phases as put forward in the model of 
Figure 1 and the definitions of contingencies as put forward in the 
theoretical framework. 
 
To validate the analytical inferences from the data, both with regard to 
contingencies and phases, two measures were taken. First, any 
inference should be supported by at least two different sources for that 
particular case. Second, to increase the reliability of the analysis, two 
independent referees assessed the coding and other inferences. The 
inferences were only valid if both referees supported the analysis of 
the data as done by the researcher. The referees held at least a MSc. 
34  
degree in public administration or management, and had extensive 
practical knowledge and experience in the field of e-government 
project governance.  
	  
	  
Project	  D	  
Case report 
Project D involved the development and implementation of a 
government to business (G2B) system. The initial approach involved 
the purchase of a prototype system from a quasi-government 
organisation, which was then developed further by a government 
agency. The purchase of the prototype system can be characterised as 
the project’s initiation. Despite high expectations and positive 
attitudes among intended users, no specific budget was set at project 
initiation to develop and implement the system. Within the 
responsible government agency, the director was appointed as project 
executive. The project executive subsequently arranged an initial 
project budget. 
 
Three months after project initiation, a project manager was hired. 
The project manager formed a project team of around 12 people, 
including functional designers, testers, communication employees, 
and secretaries. Another government agency was contracted after that 
to take up further development and operational maintenance of the 
system. Four months later, the project executive noticed that progress 
with the development was slow and raised concerns. Although 
development was done relatively isolated from the executive 
organisation, more and more signals were coming his way that the 
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prototype system was technically flawed and therefore inappropriate 
for further development and implementation on a large scale.  
 
After some initial attempts to remedy the problems, an external 
auditor was hired to do a technical assessment of the prototype 
system. One year and 3 months after the project had started, the 
external auditor’s report came out, confirming the technical concerns. 
The prototype system was characterised as vulnerable, with numerous 
errors in the underlying logic and structure. It was advised to either 
repair the prototype system or reengineer the system. Based on 
another external review, the choice was made to reengineer the 
system. To this end, the same government agency was contracted that 
had taken up the initial development and operational maintenance of 
the prototype system. The project plan was changed such that the 
schedule was to deliver a new system in four months with an adjusted 
budget of around 1.5 times the initial budget. Reengineering started 
one year and six months after project initiation, and was to be 
completed in four months. However, the supplier lacked the 
organisational discipline and structure to make the new system work. 
As a result, over the period of one year results were disappointing and 
technical adaptations and rework was needed, requiring more time 
and resources. 
 
Even though the reengineering of the system lasted more than three 
times longer than initially planned, the project executive did not stop 
or redirect the project, as each time promises were given that the 
issues would be resolved soon and the system was on the edge of 
completion. Unable to assess the validity of such claims, the project 
executive allowed continuation. He believed that redirection or 
stopping would be costlier, as the system would be delivered soon. In 
reality, the belief that the project was almost complete was false and 
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the project continued to consume resources without completing its 
objectives. 
 
Two years after the start of the project, the sequence of bad news 
about the progress of the reengineering lead to a deterioration of the 
relationship between the executive organisation and the developing 
government agency. Frustrated about the continued schedule 
overruns, the executive had turned to the contract, demanding results. 
Replacement of the project manager four times in fives months 
ensued. Finally, frustrations were so high that the stalemate had to be 
broken. An external auditor was hired to assess the approach and its 
feasibility. It was concluded that the developing government agency 
wasn’t equipped for such a project and that it would be wiser to 
outsource the development of the system to the market. Furthermore, 
the auditor’s report concluded that the executive needed to be much 
more directly involved in the realisation of the project through a 
dedicated governance organisation. 
 
Three years after the initiation of the project, the budget was adjusted 
to more than 2 times the initial budget and public procurement was 
started to outsource development to the market. Furthermore, a 
professional and dedicated governance organisation was created to 
ensure close involvement of the executive function in the realisation. 
This new course of action resulted in the successful delivery of the 
system within the adjusted budget and a little more than five years 
after project initiation. 
37 
 
 
Project run time 5 years 
Number of (explicit) resource 
allocation decisions 
3 
Percentage of initial budget 
consumed by the project 
209% 
Outcome Completed 
 
Table 3 – Project D overview 
 
Project escalation process 
 
The transitions into the different phases of the escalation process can 
be identified in project D. Transition into the drift phase occurs when 
lack of progress emerged due to shortcomings in the project (Mähring 
& Keil, 2008). Drift in this form started due to technical complexities 
encountered in the early stages of project D, almost from the moment 
that development of the prototype system was initiated.  
 
The moment that management signals that there are problems to be 
remedied defines the transition into the next phase of the escalation 
process. This is the unsuccessful incremental adaptation phase, 
because adaptations were made but there was a continued mismatch 
between underlying problems and attempted remedies. In the case of 
project D, this phase clearly occurred when the change was made to 
reengineer the system. However, the underlying problem of technical 
complexity remained because the development stayed with the same 
organisation, which was still not equipped to effectively deal with the 
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(new) technical challenges that the course of action involved. 
Nonetheless, the course of action was continued because the project 
executive did not have the information that made him aware of the 
true effectiveness of the project. 
 
The transition into the third stage of the escalation process of project 
D occurred when the problems with the lack of progress became 
increasingly visible but were then rationalised by the development 
organisation claiming that past problems were now under control and 
the system was almost complete. This is consistent with the definition 
that rationalised continuation is characterised by recurrent actions that 
serve to explain, or rationalise, why problems are acceptable despite 
being clearly visible and of a magnitude that is beyond what 
organisational norms, procedures, and rules would normally allow. 
 
Finally, conflict between the executive board of the project and the 
supplier, fuelled by critical external audits, was a development that 
posed an imminent threat to continuation, promoting de-escalation. 
De-escalation was indeed initiated after this by moving the project 
from the development organisation to the market through a public 
procurement procedure. 
 
The timeline and escalation process are modelled in Figure 3. 
Subsequently, the salience of contingencies over the course of the 
escalation process as shown in this figure is elaborated. 
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Figure 3 – Project D timeline and escalation process 
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Contingencies driving ineffectiveness of the course of action 
 
Project D encountered technical complexities that drove the course of 
action to be less than effective. For instance, the development of the 
prototype system turned out to be more technologically challenging 
than anticipated. 
 
“[A]nd more signals came to us from [the supplier] like: ‘It is actually a 
funny application.’ […] And [then] we asked [an external expert] to do 
an analysis of the application on code level. And that yielded that it was a 
shaky application, with a lot of loops and dead links, but it was 
reparable.” 
Key project staff member 1 
“Then it became clear that is was more a one-dimensional system that 
could be rolled out for [its intended purpose]” 
Key project staff member 2 
 “Originally, the system would have been finished, but the development 
of [the prototype system], turned out to be more technically challenging 
than anticipated.” 
Press article 
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In the phase of reengineering, more technical complexity emerged, in 
the form of problems with the innovativeness and inherent risk of the 
chosen technology. As a result of this, the course of action maintained 
a lack of effectiveness in the phase of reengineering, a period that ran 
for more than three times the intended schedule. 
 
“[The reengineering was done with] very innovative technology, for 
which even the most basic components still had to be built. […] What 
happened was that the project got into more and more trouble.” 
Internal report 
“From independent research […] it became apparent that the innovative 
technology used by [the supplier] generated risks for the realisation and 
the future maintenance of [the system]. Based on this, it was decided to 
continue the development of [the system] on more conventional 
technology. […] [The use of innovative technology] caused delay in the 
project.” 
Internal report 
 
 
Contingencies driving commitment to the course of action 
 
Information asymmetry was salient in project D and formed a 
contingency that drove commitment to the course of action that had 
become ineffective due to technical complexities. Both in the phase of 
further development of the prototype system and the phase of 
reengineering, the executive organisation was not involved closely 
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enough to receive timely feedback on the ineffectiveness of the course 
of action. Instead, the project executive had a transactional orientation 
in the relationship with the supplier, relying on contracts and progress 
reports as sufficient instruments for control. As a result, both the 
development of the prototype system and the reengineering was 
allowed to drift for more than three times the intended schedule. 
 
“[T]here was an increasing gap between the expectations of the project 
executive, who was asking ‘When is it done? When is it done?’ and the 
supplier […], who said ‘Next month’ or ‘In half a year. Give us half a 
year and than we’re done’. Those are all signals that you should 
recognise as a project executive: ‘This is bad’. But instead, well, they 
waited for half a year.” 
Key project staff member 2 
“[The project executive] didn’t have a clue [about what was going on at 
the side of the supplier. [I]n my view […] the project executive was in an 
ivory tower. He had lists and progress reports and that was that.” 
Key project staff member 3 
 “[We] ascertain that the following best practices […] have been 
insufficiently expressed: close involvement of the executive in the 
governance of the development […]” 
Evaluation report 
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Towards the final stage of intended development, the developing 
organisation started to rationalise further delays by claiming that these 
were just the final additional steps needed towards completion. This 
suggests the salience of a completion effect as another contingency 
driving commitment to the failing course of action. The executive 
organisation, being unable to verify the validity of the statements 
made by the developing organisation, continued to invest in the course 
of action that had not yet proved that it would deliver the expected 
results. After all, the executive organisation did not want to terminate 
or redirect a project that was at the verge of completion. 
 
“Non-verifiable statements were given that 95 percent was completed.” 
Key project staff member 2 
“That is such a 95 percent project. That is exactly what happened here. 
There was no control. On a certain moment the signal came through: 
‘Just a little bit more. We’re almost done, we’re almost done.’” 
Key project staff member 3 
“That entire year was trouble. [The supplier] didn’t deliver. And they 
kept making promises. And in the end we got the promise that 95 percent 
was completed, then and then.” 
Key project staff member 1 
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Project	  S	  
Case report 
Project S entailed the development and implementation of a 
government-to-government (G2G) backend system. The initial 
objective of the project was primarily to replace a legacy system with 
a new system. As with the legacy system, the new system would be a 
decentralised solution, with different regional offices and different 
agencies each having their own isolated copy of the system. Thus, the 
project involved a collaborative effort of different autonomous 
organisations to develop a common e-government system. The initial 
budget was set and the project planned to be completed in a little less 
than four years.  
 
After the first three years of design and development of the system 
architecture and the first functional module, both the approach and 
objectives of the project were drastically changed. Instead of aiming 
for a decentralised solution to replace the legacy system, the objective 
shifted towards the development of a centralised system that would 
deliver G2G and location independent functionalities. Leading up to 
the scope shift, the project executive had been replaced six months 
earlier, as a result of retirement. The new project executive concluded 
from the results of a pilot, which had started a year earlier that the 
original scope could no longer be maintained. The main arguments 
were that the pilots had showed that the current solution had technical 
complications, and that changing societal and political demands 
necessitated a change and expansion of objectives. The 
implementation of these changing demands were part of a change 
programme that ran in parallel at the key organisation, and 
implications for project S had become clearer over time. As a result of 
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the executive’s decision, the system architecture and functional 
module that had been developed so far became practically obsolete. 
Three years after the initiation of the project, design and development 
of the system was thus restarted from scratch. More than half of the 
initial budget was depleted at that point, but no new budget was 
explicitly set. The planning was adjusted to complete the project with 
its complete new scope in three more years, which would be six years 
after project initiation. Although the new scope involved a centralised 
solution, it still required the collaboration of multiple autonomous 
organisations to create a shared end result. 
 
After one year and eight months of design and development according 
to the new scope, a pilot version of the system was delivered that 
contained the largest part of its functionality. Functional issues that 
were identified during the subsequent user pilots led to a repetitive 
pattern of adaptation and new piloting. As a result the pilot period 
ultimately ran for sixteen months rather then the four months that was 
initially planned. 
 
The functional issues that were raised in the pilots also started to 
become a source of conflict between two executive organisations in 
the collaboration. This conflict endured after the pilot was concluded 
with a rejection of the system and a stalemate about the system’s 
intended quality and functionality remained. This stalemate continued 
for seven more months, before a taskforce was finally created to reach 
a resolution and a new course of action. The creation of the taskforce 
was triggered by a second change in the project’s executive. At the 
time of this change, slightly less than twice the initial budget had been 
consumed by the project. 
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The taskforce changed the course of the project significantly on 
multiple dimensions, including appointing executive power of the 
project to only one organisation within the original collaboration. The 
launch of the taskforce signified the initiation of de-escalation as the 
new approach led to a termination of the project ten years after its 
initiation and after having spent twice its initial budget. Although the 
majority of functionality was implemented at that point, most of the 
objectives were not obtained. Among the objectives that were not 
realised was the replacement of the legacy system, which is still 
running in parallel to the new system. 
 
Project run time 10 years 
Number of (explicit) resource 
allocation decisions 
3 
Percentage of initial budget 
consumed by the project 
206% 
Outcome Terminated with partial result 
 
Table 4 – Project S overview 
 
Project escalation process 
 
Project S ran rather isolated and with relative ease for the first two and 
a half years after initiation. However, because of this isolation, the 
work of the project organisation became less and less aligned with the 
changing context of the user organisation. After this initial period of 
two and a half years, a new project executive was appointed. The new 
executive was also highly involved with the changing context of the 
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user organisation and therefore decided six months after his 
appointment that the objectives of the project should be drastically 
changed. This decision meant all work in the first three years after 
initiation had become ineffective. The project remained in drift for 
two years more, because even though the course of action had been 
radically altered, management did not signal new problems with the 
project that made it ineffective until the second pilot was underway. 
 
During this second pilot, it became clear to executive management 
that the project was indeed in trouble, signifying a transition into the 
phase of unsuccessful incremental adaptation. These adaptations were 
unsuccessful as they were technical remedies while the lack of 
progress in the project was mainly due to a lack of user feedback 
during development that resulted in problems of adoption. 
 
After rejection of the system in the second pilot, problems were 
clearly visible but there were persistent efforts to explain or 
rationalise these problems. This signified transition into the phase of 
rationalised continuation. In the case of project S, rationalisations 
focused on arguing that the project had to continue because the risk of 
continuation was preferable to incurring the losses associated with 
termination. Furthermore, the project executive at that moment was 
championing the course of action, even though it was failing. 
 
Finally, a new project executive was appointed as a result of 
retirement of his predecessor, and the new executive acknowledged 
that the project was faced with an imminent threat to continuation, 
and assembled a taskforce to shape its re-direction. This event 
triggered the initiation of de-escalation. 
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The timeline and escalation process are modelled in Figure 4. 
Subsequently, the salience of contingencies over the course of the 
escalation process as shown in this figure is elaborated. 
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Figure 4 - Project S timeline and escalation process 
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Contingencies driving ineffectiveness of the course of action 
 
In the first phase of project S, the project was eventually completely 
ineffective due to changing requirements. The user organisation was 
subject to a very dynamic context, which created new requirements 
for the system. As the project organisation was separated from the 
executive organisation, they received little feedback about this 
changing organisational context and thus did not adapt their 
deliverables accordingly. When the system was eventually delivered 
for the first pilot, the lack of fit had become so large that the project 
executive decided that practically all requirements for the system 
needed to be changed, suggesting that all investments in the first two 
years had been entirely ineffective. 
 
“So all kinds of things were happening, and the project neatly followed 
their own IT oriented approach. But because of this, it was delivering 
things that did not fit the context anymore. That connection was 
missing.” 
Key project staff member 2 
“With the new approach, no match was made between the needs of the 
organisation and the objective of the new system. As a consequence, 
there was no recognition of a potential mismatch or existing gaps 
between organisation and objectives.” 
External review report 
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“From the pilot, [the executive board] came up with documents wherein 
proposals were made to reconsider [the project]. […] Demands that were 
imposed from a political and societal point of view on the (end)products 
of the [executive organisation], made the (only) starting point for 
development of [the system], namely the replacement of [the legacy 
system], no longer sustainable.” 
External review report 
 
 
After the lack of fit of the project organisation’s activities and the user 
organisation’s needs was identified in the first pilot, a significant 
change was made in the course of action by changing the 
requirements. The project was now still aimed at legacy replacement, 
but now as centralised solution that also aimed at digitalisation of 
processes, a location independent working environment, inter-
organisational collaboration, and the retrieval of policy information. 
However, the user organisation remained relatively poorly involved in 
the realisation, thereby creating a risk for the adoption of the system. 
That the system did indeed not fit the needs and expectations of the 
user organisation became apparent over the course of another failed 
pilot. The eventual rejection from the user organisation that followed 
from this pilot, implied yet another two years of ineffectiveness.  
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“So in other words, the traditional story happened; we delivered an IT 
system, […] but the users were insufficiently aware of the new policy. So 
it was a crappy system” 
Key project staff member 4 
“And what we then noticed, in the pilot phase, was that the users said: 
‘But this is not what we want’.” 
Key project staff member 1 
“The connection between [what the IT organisation was doing and what 
the two user organisations wanted] was really thin, with project-board 
meetings and minimal governance of the IT-organisation. And that IT-
organisation did their thing and just powered through. […] And they 
made the system and then it exploded, because the users said: ‘We don’t 
want this. This and this is missing and I can do this with the current 
system and now I can’t do that anymore’.” 
Key project staff member 2 
 
 
In addition to lack of fit, there was also conflict between the two 
executive organisations over functional requirements. This all resulted 
in an eventual rejection of the system in the second pilot, implying 
more ineffectiveness. The executive power of project S was divided 
between two organisations, which had different interests. This became 
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a problem when conflict arose between the two organisations over the 
results of the second pilot and subsequent adaptations. As a result, 
there was no decisiveness with regard to redirection of the project’s 
course of action. 
 
“From the delivery of [the system] it became clear that appointing 
executive power to two organisation does not work. […] The complexity 
of the relationship between [the key partners] caused a complexity that 
made managing the program impossible.” 
External review report 
“The project failed among other things because of poor alignment 
between [the two executive organisations].” 
Press article 
 
 
Contingencies driving commitment to the course of action 
 
From the beginning of the project until the end of the second pilot 
period, commitment to the course of action was driven by information 
asymmetry. As the executive board lacked information from the 
project organisation to accurately assess progress and risk within the 
project, they allowed the project to continue even though the course of 
action was ineffective. This happened in the first three years, leading 
up to the first pilot results, and it happened again in the subsequent 
two years towards the second pilot. It was mentioned that the lack of 
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feedback was not only the result of a poorly involved executive 
organisation, but also of misrepresentations by the project 
organisation. 
 
 “[T]he IT-project had become a kingdom of its own. The governance 
was as thin as paper. […] So with regard to the direction from the [the 
executive organisation].” 
Key project staff member 2 
“And that is something that can be said about the project management in 
that period, that they were telling only half truths in my taste. In a way 
that it everything appeared to be running well, while under the surface 
there were all kinds of open ends and questions.” 
Key project staff member 3 
“[There] were hardly any checks or evaluations.” 
External review report 
 
 
Project S also involved a considerable risk-seeking bias, at least 
within the key executive organisation, emphasising that terminating 
the project would lead to an unacceptable loss from both the 
investments already done as well as from operational problems that 
would result from not completing the project. As such, the key 
decision makers implicitly preferred the risky continuation of the 
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project, with potentially an even larger loss of resources. This bias 
significantly increased the level of commitment to the course of 
action, an effect that became salient in the final phase of the escalation 
process of rationalised continuation. The continuation of the project 
was rationalised with the argument that there was simply no 
alternative but to continue, because the legacy system could not be 
maintained. 
 
“We had to do it. Because [the legacy system] was really out-dated. So 
the organisation had to do it.” 
Key project staff member 3 
“I recently saw the reports again, with dramatic stories, also by the 
[external reviewer], like: ‘[The legacy system] has to go, […] [the 
executive organisation] has to act, it has to renew.’ These images were 
very strong back then. So termination was [not an option]. 
Key project staff member 2 
 “So our assessment was: There is no real alternative, you have to do 
something. That has been our driver to continue.” 
Key project staff member 1 
 
 
The project executive’s decision to shift the objective after three 
years, and thereby accept all investment thus far as lost reflects 
56  
another contingency that drove commitment to the course of action. 
Multiple sources stated that this had been a bold move, increasing his 
personal accountability, and that the project executive acted as a 
strong advocate of the new approach. In fact, the new approach 
mainly resulted from his personal vision and ambition. On the one 
hand, this increased executive involvement, which was beneficial for 
the project organisation from a practical point of view. On the other 
hand, it promoted commitment to a course of action through potential 
self-justification by the project executive. With the appointment of a 
new project executive, this ceased to drive commitment. 
 
 “And he had a very clear vision, as in ‘this is how it will be’, and he 
decided. […] So in that was a certain commitment to the course of action 
[…]. With that, it also was even more directive. So it was really if you 
didn’t fit into that direction, if you didn’t cohere, then you would have to 
go.” 
Key project staff member 4 
 “[The project executive] was the architect of the modern [organisation], 
of the business rational way of working within the [organisation].” 
Press article 
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Project	  T	  
Case report 
Project T involved the development and implementation of a range of 
backend systems within a single government agency. Starting out as a 
programme to replace out-dated legacy systems, the project’s 
executives decide to follow an approach based on standardised 
solutions. The reasoning was that standardised solutions would 
significantly reduce the development time and costs of maintenance. 
However, the organisation had no existing experience or knowledge 
with regard to the chosen solution. 
 
The first step in the project was to pilot the chosen solution with the 
development and implementation of a single, non-complex functional 
module. Through this, the intention was to develop a better 
understanding of the solution, that was new to the organisation, and 
gain insights into the feasibility of the total project. Because of the 
relative low complexity, the pilot module was successfully completed 
within the planned first year of the project. 
 
The initially planned second step in the project was to develop and 
implement the other functional modules needed to replace all the 
legacy systems. However, the upcoming introduction of new 
legislation made the project executive decide to combine the objective 
of legacy replacement with the new objective of implementing the 
new legislation. In fact, the focus for the second step in the project 
was to develop a functional module that would support part of the 
new legislation’s execution, meaning that no further contributions to 
the replacement of legacy systems were made from that point on. 
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Matching the logic of the new legislation on the standardised solution 
was challenging and delayed the design phase. Also, the project 
organisation needed to work with components of the standard solution 
that were non-proven and for which they held little experience or 
knowledge. Nine months after the design of the module had started, it 
was recognised that the initial planning to complete the module in one 
year could no longer be met. Some initial adaptations were made in 
the development of the module and a delay of three months was 
accepted. The module was brought live as release 1 of the new 
system. 
 
The next step was to develop more functionality that was needed to 
deliver the new legislation in a second release, as it was recognised 
that more complex functionality was needed to support the full 
executional scope. After about six months of design and development, 
three years into the project, it became clear that both the module of 
release 1 and the new functionality in release 2 was fraught with 
technical and functional issues, such as poor performance and 
stability, the need for many workarounds, and poor maintainability. 
The project budget was nearly doubled at that point in anticipation of 
the extra work needed to resolve the issues and still meet all the 
objectives. 
 
Three years and nine months after project initiation the second release 
was delivered, but the technical and functional issues remained. The 
objective of the project then shifted towards resolution of issues 
related to the new functionality. Further efforts to implement the new 
legislation and replace the legacy system were abandoned. By 
releasing new versions of the system the technical and functional 
issues were to be solved. With each release, that took about two 
months to deliver, the issues remained unsolved. This necessitated the 
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development of a next release, which was then promised to be the 
definitive release to solve the issue. 
 
So far, the project executive had continued, based on the 
rationalisation and firm belief that the next release would clear the 
issues. But with the unambiguous feedback of an external independent 
advisor, his delegates and four failed releases all credibility of that 
rationalisation was gone. After a swift consideration of alternatives, 
efforts to redirect the course of action were crafted and de-escalation 
was initiated nearly four and a half years after project initiation.  
 
With a new approach that involved combining custom-made 
functionality in generic code with the existing standard solution, and 
significant changes in governance, the project was terminated within 
four months. The adjusted budget was depleted at that point. The 
technical and functional issues were resolved when the project was 
terminated, but the objective of legacy replacement was not realised 
and the objective of implementing the functionality needed for the 
new legislation was only partially realized. 
  
Project run time 6 years 
Number of (explicit) resource 
allocation decisions 
3 
Percentage of initial budget 
consumed by the project 
193% 
Outcome Terminated with partial result 
 
Table 5 – Project T overview 
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Project escalation process 
 
Project T started to show lack of progress from the moment the pilot 
was completed, and the development of the first release was initiated. 
This lack of progress was the result of inherent shortcomings of the 
project, most dominantly technical issues with the innovative solution 
that was chosen, thus signifying drift. Although a lack of progress was 
identified, as can be concluded from the schedule extensions granted 
during this phase, no structured problems were signalled, as no 
adaptations were made. 
 
That the course of action of the project was troubled was signalled 
during the development of the second release. Incremental technical 
adaptations were made, which were unsuccessful in solving the 
structural problems that lay within the course of action demanded by 
the innovative solution. As such, the moment that problems were 
recognised and the budget adjusted to compensate for incremental 
adaptations is identified as the start of the unsuccessful incremental 
adaptation phase. 
 
Some time after the delivery of the second release and on-going 
attempts to solve the technical issues, problems became clearly 
visible. This is evident in the fact that during this stage an external 
auditor reported the problematic situation on multiple occasions. At 
the same time, there were recurring actions to explain or rationalise 
these problems by the project executive and thus continue with the 
project. These rationalisations included using earlier investments as a 
reason for continuation and downplaying the severity of problems in a 
belief that the next release would get the project back on track. This 
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phase of rationalised continuation ran from the first report by the 
external auditor until the delivery of the fifth failed release. 
 
After five unsuccessful releases and the project executive had 
received unbiased and clear feedback about the state of the project by 
the external advisor and key project staff members, it became clear to 
him that there was an imminent threat to continuation. The fifth 
release had been positioned as an ultimatum to prove that the 
rationalisations were justified. When this release failed to deliver, the 
project executive and his staff initiated project de-escalation. 
 
The timeline and escalation process are modelled in Figure 5. 
Subsequently, the salience of contingencies over the course of the 
escalation process as shown in this figure is elaborated. 
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Figure 5 – Project T timeline and escalation process 
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Contingencies driving ineffectiveness of the course of action 
 
Initial ineffectiveness in the course of action of project T occurred due 
to lack of fit with unclear requirements, associated with the new 
legislation that had to be implemented by the executive organisation. 
The full executional scope of the new legislation still had to become 
clear during development, leading to lack of progress due to 
introduction of new requirements. 
 
“And when we started, we didn’t have the picture clear that [the new 
legislation] would imply a composite product. So we saw with [the new 
legislation] mainly [this single functionality], and it only became clear 
over the course of the first year that it would also involve [other 
functionalities].” 
Key project staff member 2 
“That first design phase took way too long. Because […] there was a lot 
of uncertainty about: ‘There is new legislation, but what will this new 
legislation really look like in terms of implementation?’” 
Key project staff member 2 
 “We thought that we could suffice with certain modules. And then when 
started to better model [the new legislation], we discovered: ‘No, we 
really do need other modules.” 
Key project staff member 2 
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“The combination of system renewal with the implementation of new 
legislation has resulted in the beginning in much discussion with regard 
to functionality.” 
External review report 
 
 
Project T also struggled with technical complexity from the moment 
that development of the functionality for the new legislation began. 
Many technical issues surfaced during this development. This created 
a steep learning curve and it could not be predicted where the learning 
curve would end. These problems were partly a result of the decision 
to pursue a technical solution that was largely unproven. Also, using 
the solution within a government context to operationalise new 
legislation was an entirely new application of this technology and thus 
experimental.  
 
Initially, the project’s course of action was to anticipate technical 
complexity by beginning with a pilot. However, a relatively easy and 
functionally predictable part of the system was chosen for this pilot. 
As such, the pilot was not truly representative of the technical 
complexity that was present. 
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“We had a new product with all uncertainties involved, […] a totally new 
technology, a new methodology. […] That’s asking for trouble. In all 
honesty.” 
Key project staff member 2 
“And it was undoubtedly a case of increasing insight. If you have never 
have worked with the [technology], it is no surprise to me that in month 
thirteen you say: ‘Gosh, this is how it really should be done.’ But in 
month fifteen you discover that it still can be done in a better way. And 
that learning curve is not at all at its end in month fifteen.” 
Key project staff member 1 
 “[The technology] was an entirely new world to the [project 
organisation], how you should do that. So you begin a trajectory of 
millions, with two technological components that you totally do not 
grasp.” 
Key project staff member 1 
“Risks of the project are:  
• Technical complexity: innovative character of the technology 
[…].” 
External review report 
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Contingencies driving commitment to the course of action 
 
Project T applied a typical principal-agent structure for the 
governance of the project, with a separate project organisation. From 
the evidence it can be inferred that the project organisation, which had 
grown to a size of around one hundred people at the start of 
development of the second release, had come to operate quite isolated 
from the executive organisation. As a consequence, the project 
executive and his delegates lacked the information and knowledge 
needed to assess the risks and progress within the isolated project 
organisation. This implied that there was an information asymmetry, 
which eventually played an important role in commitment to the 
failing course of action.   
 
For example, the project executive remained unaware of the design 
difficulties in the first release for nine months. Later, the technical and 
functional issues in the second release were not identified before eight 
months of development. One key informant used the metaphor of a 
submarine for this phenomenon. The project organisation would 
submerge and would have no idea when and where it would surface 
again. 
 
“[T]here had been talk for quite some time on issues, without that those 
had been brought up.” 
Key project staff member 2 
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“The [project organisation] were working relatively autonomously on 
their own things, and that just went on. […] Especially in terms of money 
and not in terms of results. So that was the big issue.” 
Key project staff member 1 
“There was a burn-rate of a million, but there was no idea what we would 
get for that million.’ You can certainly say that [the executive had no 
realistic picture of progress or risk]. 
Key project staff member 1 
“[The project went] under water for a long time, and then you can only 
hope that that submarine would surface at the right time at the right 
moment. But it didn’t.” 
Key project staff member 1 
 
 
Both during unsuccessful incremental adaptation and rationalised 
continuation, there was an optimism bias with the project executive. 
Even though lack of objective information due to information 
asymmetry made such assumptions unfounded, the executive had a 
strong belief that the project was going to succeed. In spite of several 
warning signs, including critical reports from an external auditor, 
optimism about the positive outcome of the project remained high and 
this meant that no steps were taken to terminate or re-direct it. This 
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overconfidence was related to the fact that part of the functionality of 
the system was already in production as a result of the pilot. 
 
“So it was new and with these confident signals, [the project executive] 
was thinking: ‘[These warnings are nice], but it will work out fine.’” 
Key project staff member 1 
“[S]omething was already running in operation, so that gave the trust 
like: ‘Why wouldn’t it succeed? It is already running. Some adaptations 
need to be made, but that’s logical.’” 
Key project staff member 2 
 
 
From an early stage in the project, the project executive had also 
championed the objectives and chosen course of action of the project, 
both internally and externally. According to different key informants, 
the project and the course of action had as such become an object of 
prestige for the project executive. The reputational stakes of the 
project executive implied that self-justification was driving 
commitment to the course of action in project T, particularly as a 
reason to rationalise continuation towards the end of the escalation 
process. Indeed, to initiate de-escalation the project executive 
experienced severe reputational loss to finally abandon the failing 
course of action. 
 
69 
 
“So he had been the great advocate of this program, also internally. He 
had always said: ‘I’m the executive and I will make sure it succeeds.’” 
Key project staff member 1 
 “And that’s what I’m trying to make clear, that he committed himself as 
project executive too much to the choices within the approach.” 
Key project staff member 1 
 “If you look for example to [the project executive], he has a drive, but 
also put a lot of his prestige on this [project].” 
Key project staff member 2 
 
 
A sunk cost effect was also driving commitment to the failing course 
of action. As the level of incurred costs was already significant at the 
moment that problems became clearly visible to the project executive 
during the series of failed releases, it formed a rationalisation to 
continue with the course of action. Two key informants confirmed 
that sunk costs were taken into consideration in decisions to continue, 
as it was argued that these costs had to be somehow justified by 
completing the project through the course of action for which the 
costs were incurred. 
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“Look, you invested in this heavily. You also know that if you throw it 
out of the window, you will need time to rebuild it. We already had an 
earlier delay in the beginning, so to come up yet again with a severe 
delay is not a success. You hope […] that the basis can be maintained and 
that with [incremental] adaptations you can still save the [project].”  
Key project staff member 2 
“[We] couldn’t get away with… because we bought the world in 
licenses… saying ‘we’re going to throw that in the trash’.” 
Key project staff member 3 
 
 
Project	  Q	  
Case report 
Project Q was an initiative to implement a citizen-to-government 
(C2G) system to support law enforcement. Similar to project D, 
project Q involved the development of unfamiliar technology. To 
anticipate for the uncertainties that this involved, the project followed 
an incremental approach for delivering the project results. This 
incremental approach first involved a number of suppliers who were 
asked to set up their potential solutions for the system in a laboratory 
setting. These solutions were not developed for the particular purpose 
of the project yet, but nonetheless fully functional. The laboratory 
setup was completed within four months after project initiation. 
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The laboratory setup was mainly aimed at discovering the possibilities 
and limitations of the unfamiliar technology. As such, the project 
organisation had an early understanding of technical contingencies 
and involved risk that would help to shape the expectations and 
requirements in the remainder of the project. Using the insights from 
the laboratory setup, a live pilot was set up according to more 
informed and adjusted technical requirements. Still, to prevent 
premature commitments that wouldn’t allow further adaptations to 
more contingencies, no official procurement was done yet. Instead, 
the pilot could be executed within the legal boundaries of public 
procurement with a random selection of two suppliers, who were 
asked to each deliver a version of the system that was already more 
tailored to expectations and requirements. The pilot started 
approximately eight months after project initiation. Because it took 
place in a live setting with real users and within the real organisational 
context, more feedback was collected with regard to key technical and 
user requirement contingencies. 
 
After little less than a year of piloting and about one-and-a-half years 
after project initiation the public procurement procedure was initiated. 
However, the insights that were gained in the pilot phase with respect 
to technical and functional contingencies had lead the executive board 
to decide for a different course of action. Instead of purchasing the 
system, which was the originally intended strategy for the 
procurement, it was decided to lease the system as a service. This 
way, the chosen supplier would remain responsible for adapting the 
system to fit with future contingencies. Several suppliers showed 
interest in this setup and made an offer. The selected supplier 
eventually delivered the first version of the system according to the 
latest functional and technical requirements within six months. Over 
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the course of two more years, adaptations were made and the scale of 
the system was extended towards eventual completion of the project. 
 
By ensuring fast feedback and adaptation throughout the project 
trajectory, it was thus eventually fully completed within four years 
after initiation. The adjusted course of action with regard to the 
procurement of the system had also implied a cost saving, resulting in 
completion with only 92 percent of the initial budget used. 
 
Project run time 4 years 
Number of (explicit) resource 
allocation decisions 
1 
Percentage of initial budget 
consumed by the project 
92% 
Outcome Completed 
 
Table 6 – Project Q overview 
 
Contingencies driving ineffectiveness of the course of action 
 
Project Q encountered many contingencies over its course that drove 
the course of action to be less effective. The laboratory phase made 
clear mainly technical complexities and uncertainties. One of the main 
discoveries was that, contrary to initial assumptions, the technology 
was not yet proven and was thus changing at a rapid pace.  
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“Whereas beforehand we had the picture: ‘We should buy [the system]. 
It’s proven technology’, we developed a picture over the course of the 
project that the technology was not at all at the end of its development.” 
Key project staff member 1 
“The procurement strategy for project [Q] has been changed. […] The 
main reason is the status of the technology and a planned large-scale 
[change in organisational context]. 
External report 
 
 
In the subsequent pilot phase, more technical complexities were 
encountered, which were mainly related to the user interface of the 
system. Significant technical changes had to be made in this respect to 
solve the issues. 
 
“When we implemented [the system in the real user environment], it 
turned out that it didn’t work at all. People couldn’t use it intuitively; 
there were technical failures, that sort of thing. So that’s when we said: 
‘We’re going to do this differently.’” 
Key project staff member 2 
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“Another lesson was that it wasn’t practical that the system was running 
on an Asian version of the operating system. The error messages (hard 
system errors) in critical situations were hard to understand and resetting 
was thus a challenge.” 
External report 
 
 
The pilot phase of the project also resulted in changing user and 
operator requirements due to live experiences with the use of the 
system. These changed requirements needed to be integrated in the 
course of action to remain effective. 
 
“[E]specially the experience of [the users] was for us as [a stakeholder] a 
reason to say: ‘This is not it. We need something different.’” 
Key project staff member 2 
“People were confronted with a system for which they didn’t have a clue 
about what it was, what it could do and how to use it. So we had a very 
good look at the human interface. A totally different concept was then 
delivered […]. Human interface was set up in a completely different way 
than existed at that point.” 
Key project staff member 3 
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 “After evaluation it will be determined what the specifications are for the 
definitive setup and what is most comfortable for [users] in operating. In 
this, the experiences of [users] and [operators] will be integrated.” 
Press article 
 
 
Contingencies driving commitment to the course of action 
 
Knowing that there was a reasonable chance that they would be faced 
with technical complexities and changing requirements, the executive 
team of project Q took an approach that would maintain a certain 
degree of flexibility. Although not consciously, these measures 
proved to be effective in circumventing contingencies that could 
promote commitment, mainly with regard to information asymmetry 
and sunk costs. 
 
The laboratory setup and pilot provided early and accurate, 
operational feedback. As a result, the executive team of the project 
was able to take many smaller and larger redirective actions and adapt 
to contingencies like technical complexity and changing requirements. 
The most significant example of redirection was to change the public 
procurement strategy from buying the system to leasing it (as-a-
service procurement). The early and accurate feedback meant that 
information asymmetry was never especially salient as there was 
sufficient awareness about potential problems with the course of 
action. 
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“We placed [several] different versions of the [system] in our laboratory. 
And we played with it for a couple of months, technicians worked it, and 
we had different people make use of it. […] So that also gave us a lot of 
information for the second phase.”  
Key project staff member 1 
“The feedback has always been really fast and direct, at least in my 
direction. I never experienced problems with that. […] But we also put 
[the system] into operation very fast. So when it was there […] people 
could experience first-hand if and how it would work.” 
Key project staff member 2 
“[By creating the laboratory setup] you show what you are working on as 
a project, you show results. You show: ‘You’re money is being spent in a 
right way.’ At the same time, you also show: ‘There is lot of uncertainty 
facing us all.’” 
Key project staff member 3 
 
 
A potential sunk cost effect was also circumvented, by only making 
gradual investments as more information about the most effective 
course of action became available. The most explicit example of this 
was that the procurement procedure was postponed to the latest 
possible stage in the project. At that point, the project team had 
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already collected a lot more information about contingencies that 
influenced the effectiveness of the project and could adapt to them 
without having to accept sunk costs of large investments in an 
ineffective course of action. Furthermore, the eventual procurement 
strategy ensured flexibility from the perspective of sunk costs by 
leasing rather than purchasing the system. As a result, sunk costs did 
not play a role as a potential driver of commitment to the course of 
action in project Q. 
 
“[We didn’t want to] become financially responsible forever for 
something, [without knowing] what the quality is of the stuff we 
implement here. No, make sure that you have a marking point somewhere 
where you can still turn around.” 
Key project staff member 3 
“We couldn’t implement it [full scope], because that would become too 
expensive. But we did say: ‘We want a robust pilot, so that we can take 
more than just a learning of [small prototype system].’” 
Key project staff member 2 
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“So then we said: ‘How smart would it be to buy and implement 
something now that has a lifecycle of ten years […] and where you have 
a large risk that you want all sorts of changes, and you don’t know if it is 
what you want?’ Or functionality changes so much that with three or four 
years you say: ‘I want something else.’ Or much smarter technology is 
introduced. Or new legislation is introduced, that says: ‘You also need to 
do this and that.’” 
Key project staff member 3 
 
	  
Project	  P	  
Case report 
Project P was a project aimed at legacy replacement and 
modernisation of the information technology landscape at a central 
information service of the Dutch government. Designed as an 
ambitious programme, the initial project executive consulted an e-
government project expert on the most appropriate approach. This 
was motivated by previous experiences with escalated projects within 
the vicinity of project P, including project S (Chapter 4). 
 
Based on the advice of the e-government project expert, the project 
executive decided to start with a small increment of the entire 
programme, that could be completed within a relatively short-time 
frame and which would have immediate value to the user 
organisation, even if other intended parts of the programme were 
never. This was a deliberate choice, as it was recognised in particular 
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that there would be significant uncertainties in the modernisation, 
which involved innovative technology. Nonetheless, an initial multi-
year budget was assigned for the entire programme. 
 
A suitable first increment was defined with the development of an 
information portal. This increment was assigned to another project 
executive who had already been responsible for a similar initiative in 
a previous context. The development of the information portal would 
entail close collaboration between the executive organisation and a 
partner government agency for the exchange of data. A business case 
and plan was developed, which included a first increment that would 
consume an investment of two-and-a-half percent of the total budget 
and require approximately six months to complete. 
 
Within the first few months of development, it became apparent that 
the initial assumptions with regard to availability of critical data for 
the information portal were false. As a result, the completion of the 
portal required a significantly higher investment to correct errors, 
leading to changes that saw eight percent of the total project budget 
and three times the initial schedule being allocated to the first 
increment. Eventually the information portal was completed and 
launched, fully functional. 
 
During development, it had also turned out that the organisational 
readiness of the executive organisation was not at the level assumed 
necessary to complete the programme, in terms of capabilities to 
govern a programme of that magnitude and in relation to agreement 
concerning the architectural design. This also led to some adaptations 
of the course of action. 
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Based on the insights of the development of the information portal 
and institutional developments that required cuts to the multi-year 
budget, the project executive decided that it would be best to suffice 
with this partial result and terminate the programme one-and-a-half 
years after initiation, with only the eight percent of the total budget 
consumed. 
 
Project run time 1.5 years 
Number of (explicit) resource 
allocation decisions 
1 
Percentage of initial budget 
consumed by the project 
8% 
Outcome Terminated with partial result 
 
Table 7 – Project P overview 
 
 
Contingencies driving ineffectiveness of the course of action 
 
As was somewhat expected, project P was fast confronted with 
technical complexities. Due to incorrect assumptions, the availability 
of qualitative data was an issue that required significantly more time 
and resources to be resolved than was anticipated in the initial course 
of action. As a result, the scope had to be extended with additional 
technical enhancements to solve the data problems. 
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“What we delivered to [the executive organisation] from the [system of 
the partner organisation], aggregated data, turned out not to be sufficient. 
There were things unavailable that we needed. […] This we discovered.” 
Key project staff member 1 
“The discussion over the quality and cohesion and uniform delivery via 
the portal to users caused delay. [So this was related to data quality].” 
Key project staff member 1 
“[The technology] entailed a lot of things that were new, with which we 
still needed to gain experience. And definitely in the beginning this was 
not running properly.” 
Key project staff member 2 
 “It has been established that […] after three months it turned out that 
there was no agreement about the content and execution [needed] to 
establish exchange of data.” 
External review report 
 
 
Project P was also faced with problems of coordination, which were 
mainly related to the organisational readiness to govern the 
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programme, including the first increment of the information portal. 
This necessitated some organisational interventions, such as a review 
of the governance structure and subsequent adaptations. 
 
“This was really the test for the underlying architecture, the project 
management, the governance, those things needed to do right as 
conditional for a project. And you see that the test resulted in 
significantly different outcomes in terms of schedule, quality and money 
than planned. And also on other organisational aspects you see that it was 
still not a course of action, if you would continue, that you would say: ‘I 
now have sufficient certainty to start with the big picture.’” 
Key project staff member 1 
“Along the way we discovered that […] the new way of working also 
required different mechanisms for governance than [the executive 
organisation] had used until then. So that had to be developed, too.” 
Key project staff member 2 
“You’re undertaking a programme that is assuming that that organisation 
is ready, in terms of architecture, in terms of vision for the future, that 
everybody understands what you’re doing and logically contributes to 
this. Well, […] it turned out that this was not the case.” 
Key project staff member 2 
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Contingencies driving commitment to the course of action 
 
Learning from previously escalated projects, the project team for 
Project P took actions that were cautious and intuitively took 
precautions to prevent project escalation. 
 
There were two precautions that proved to be effective in 
circumventing information asymmetry. First, there was the choice for 
an iterative approach. This guaranteed that there would not be a long 
period of low project visibility. The delivery of each iteration would 
serve as a visible checkpoint of progress.  
 
“We deliberately chose a different approach than other big projects 
before us, […] with short-cycled iterations and close involvement of the 
business. By making small steps you can process changing insights really 
fast and you’re able to keep monitoring the relevant environment on the 
go.” 
Key project staff member 2 
 
 
Second, an independent auditor was hired from the outset, to 
constantly review risk and progress on behalf of the project executive. 
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“In hindsight, what I believe was a good measure, was to have continuous 
quality assurance […]. That kept us alert, like: ‘This is not going well at 
all.’ I myself, as a member of the executive board only had time to look 
at the official reports once a month. […] If we wouldn’t have kept 
constant vigilance, we wouldn’t have been able to keep the project under 
control. […] Than we simply wouldn’t have been informed properly 
about the progress.”  
Key project staff member 1 
“There was quality assurance on behalf of the project executive on the 
project. […] [T]here were all kinds of risks in the project, which brought 
us to the thought: ‘We need some external expertise there that will 
monitor together with us on both [the side of the project organisation and 
partner organisation], to ensure that we can adapt in timely fashion if 
unwillingly it would turn out that things are not running well, or we have 
some potential learning along the way.’” 
Key project staff member 4 
 
 
The iterative approach also had another important result from the 
perspective of escalation prevention; it was a way to reduce the effect 
of sunk costs. By delivering a fully functional incremental result, 
which just had value in it self regardless of future investments, the 
risk of justifying past investments with future investments was 
reduced. This was referred to by one of the informants as 
circumventing a ‘fixed-cost industry’, which he defined as a project 
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that only generates any value once it is fully completed and all costs 
are incurred, like when digging a canal. 
 
“[With the first increment] you directly have a case. So you break free 
from the ‘fixed-cost industry’ phenomenon, because you have something 
that immediately has value.”  
Key project staff member 1 
“A very important aspect of what we have done is […] chopping it up in 
smaller pieces, with each [piece] delivering value in itself. But after each 
increment it should be possible to say: ‘We had a good run, we’re 
terminating. It’s growing over our heads, it’s too complicated, it’s not the 
right course of action.’” 
Key project staff member 3 
 “Indeed, very important: Imagine that [the project] would terminate, the 
products that it delivered should have value independently.” 
Key project staff member 2 
 
 
Finally, the accounts of the informants of project P showed that the 
incremental approach had significantly reduced self-justification as 
motive to continue. On a psychological level, the respective project 
executive expressed that they did not perceive the project as a failure, 
even though it was terminated in an early stage, because it had 
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delivered value. Their earlier decisions to initiate the project had thus 
been justified. 
 
“I’m not saying that [the project so far it was executed] is a failure. [The 
initial result] has been delivered, it’s running, it’s delivering relatively 
good information, and it has given us a lot of information about how you 
should do it.”  
Key project staff member 1 
“[The project] didn’t fail. It was terminated, but it didn’t fail. It delivered 
what was intended in that first phase.”  
Key project staff member 1 
 
	  
Discussion	  
The salience of both contingencies driving ineffectiveness of the 
course of action and contingencies driving commitment in the 
investigated cases of escalated projects, compared with the cases of 
non-escalated projects, leads to the pattern shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 7 shows that while both the observed escalated and non-
escalated projects were confronted with contingencies that made the 
course of action less than effective at some point, only the escalated 
projects also showed contingencies that drove commitment to the 
course of action. Examples were found of sunk-cost effect, 
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completion effect, self-justification, information asymmetry, and 
optimism and risk- seeking biases. Political and social pressures were 
not explicitly found as a contingency for commitment.  
 
 
 
 
Escalated  
projects 
Non-escalated 
projects 
  D S T Q P 
D
ri
vi
ng
 in
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
Technical complexity ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Problems of adoption  ✔    
Conflict between 
stakeholders 
 ✔    
Problems of coordination 
and communication 
    ✔ 
Changing / new 
requirements 
 ✔ ✔ ✔  
D
ri
vi
ng
 c
om
m
itm
en
t 
Sunk cost effect   ✔   
Completion effect ✔     
Self-justification  ✔ ✔   
Information asymmetry ✔ ✔ ✔   
Optimism and risk-
seeking biases 
 ✔ ✔   
Political and societal 
pressures 
     
 
Table 8 – Salience of contingencies driving ineffectiveness or commitment in 
escalated and non-escalated projects 
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In the non-escalated projects, measures that were explicitly taken to 
address uncertainties also served to successfully circumvent 
contingencies driving commitment. The most prominent of these 
measures were short-cycled, incremental development methods and 
continuous independent reviewing of performance. 
 
The second objective of this study was to generate new theory about 
what contingencies drive e-government project escalation over the 
course of the escalation process, and how these contingencies differ 
between escalated and non-escalated e-government projects. Based on 
the analysis of the case data as presented in Table 8, the following 
theoretical propositions are offered with regard to the role of different 
types of contingencies in escalated and non-escalated e-government 
projects. 
 
TP2.1 Both in escalated and non-escalated e-government projects 
technical complexities, problems of adoption, conflict between 
stakeholders, problems of communication and coordination, 
and changing requirements drive ineffectiveness of the course 
of action. 
 
TP2.2 Only in escalated e-government projects do sunk-cost effect, 
completion effect, self-justification, information asymmetry, 
and optimism and risk-seeking biases drive commitment to a 
failing course of action. 
 
The findings of this study suggest that certain contingencies will drive 
ineffectiveness of the course of action in any e-government project at 
some point. However, some projects are able to circumvent the 
identified contingencies that drive commitment to a course of action. 
In these cases, it is likely that the ineffectiveness is identified and 
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corrected by either changing the course of action or terminating the 
project. 
 
Based on the definitions of the phases of project escalation from the 
model of Mähring and Keil (2008) and the definitions of 
contingencies as put forward in the theoretical framework, the data 
from the investigated e-government projects was also analysed for 
connections between the salience of contingencies and the phases of 
the escalation process. The results of this analysis for all escalated 
cases are summarized in Table 9. 
 
The results of this analysis of the case data lead to the following 
theoretical propositions with regard to the salience of certain 
contingencies over the course of the escalation process. 
 
TP2.3 Ineffectiveness driven by technical complexity, problems of 
adoption, problems of coordination and communication, or 
changing or new requirements, combined with commitment to 
the course of action driven by information asymmetry sets e-
government projects into escalation during the drift phase of 
the escalation process. 
 
Although this might be expected in the political and public 
environment of e-government projects, no evidence was found that 
suggests that political and social pressures are salient contingencies in 
driving commitment to a failing course of action. For the cases that 
were part of this study, there were no external pressures pushing the 
projects towards continuation. The escalation process seemed to be 
primarily an internally focussed process, which was to a large part 
hidden to the outside world. 
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 Drift 
Unsuccessful 
incremental 
adaptation 
Rationalised 
continuation 
Contingencies driving ineffectiveness 
Technical complexity ✔ ✔  
Problems of adoption ✔ ✔  
Conflict between 
stakeholders 
 ✔  
Problems of coordination 
and communication 
✔   
Changing / new 
requirements 
✔   
Contingencies driving commitment 
Sunk cost effect   ✔ 
Completion effect   ✔ 
Self-justification   ✔ 
Information asymmetry ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Optimism and risk-seeking 
biases 
 ✔ ✔ 
Political and societal 
pressures 
   
 
Table 9 – Salience of contingencies in the phases of the escalation process 
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The case evidence did suggest that contingencies driving 
ineffectiveness are most salient in the early phases of the escalation 
process. However, from a theoretical point of view it is logical that 
there should also be at least some contingencies that drive 
commitment in this stage. Otherwise, the ineffectiveness would be 
recognised and the course of action would be changed or the project 
even stopped. Results of this research suggest that in the first phase of 
the escalation process, it is mainly information asymmetry driving this 
commitment. This means that commitment in the drift phase of the 
escalation process is more an unconscious phenomenon, as it is the 
lack of awareness that any problem exists that results in the course of 
action remaining unaltered. 
 
TP2.4 Further ineffectiveness driven by technical complexity, 
problems of adoption, or conflict between stakeholders, 
combined with commitment to the course of action driven by 
information asymmetry or optimism and risk-seeking biases, 
keeps e-government projects in escalation during the 
unsuccessful incremental adaptation phase of the escalation 
process. 
 
During the unsuccessful incremental adaptation phase, it was found 
that there were still contingencies, though fewer, which could drive 
ineffectiveness further. As incremental adaptations were made, this 
would lead to more technical complexity, new problems of adoption, 
or conflict between stakeholders. Meanwhile, in addition to the role of 
information asymmetry in driving commitment during this phase, in 
the initial face of challenges to the project optimism and risk-seeking 
biases also became salient as drivers of commitment. 
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TP2.5 Sunk cost effect, completion effect, self-justification, 
information asymmetry, or optimism and risk-seeking biases 
strengthen commitment to the already ineffective course of 
action in the rationalised continuation phase of the escalation 
process of e-government projects. 
 
The findings of this study suggest that in the rationalised continuation 
phase no new contingencies emerge that lead to more ineffectiveness 
in an already ineffective course of action. In this phase, more 
contingencies become salient that strengthen commitment. Whereas in 
the preceding phases of the escalation process commitment was 
mainly driven by lack of information or biases, in the rationalised 
continuation phase other contingencies are also strengthening 
commitment in other ways. Sunk cost effect, completion effect and 
self-justification are all contingencies that serve as rationalisations for 
continuation and therefore it is logical that they emerge in this phase 
of the escalation process.  
 
Summarizing the theoretical propositions, the study presented in this 
chapter suggests that both escalated and non-escalated e-government 
projects suffer from ineffectiveness driven by a number of 
contingencies. It seems that e-government projects are risky and 
complex undertakings that will face some form of challenge with 
regards to their effectiveness at some point in their life. However, 
only when the contingencies that were specified as drivers of 
commitment to a course of action emerge will this ineffectiveness also 
lead to project escalation. Moreover, this study has uncovered a 
potential pattern in how contingencies unfold over the course of the 
escalation process. Ineffectiveness is mainly driven by contingencies 
in the early phases of the escalation process. In these early phases, 
contingencies that are related to lack of information are the main 
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drivers of commitment. In final phases of the escalation process, 
contingencies that are related to rationalisation become dominant in 
maintaining and strengthening commitment. 
 
Whereas the aforementioned theoretical propositions provide 
perspective on what drives the e-government project escalation over 
the course of the escalation process, the next chapter aims to provide 
more insight concerning how to effectively prevent e-government 
project escalation in the first place. 
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Chapter	  3 Avoiding	  the	  Storm:	  Diminishing	  the	  Likelihood	  
of	  E-­‐government	  Project	  Escalation	  
 
“Despite numerous efforts to provide managers and policy makers 
with interventions to prevent escalation of commitment, escalation 
continues to plague and cost individuals, organisations, and society.” 
 
(Ku, 2008) 
 
 
Introduction	  
Virtually all e-government projects suffer from an ineffective course 
of action at some point in their trajectory. That is, at some point in the 
project, the efforts may not lead to the desired results, because of 
contingencies like technical complexity, problems of adoption, 
conflict between stakeholders, problems coordinating communication, 
and changing requirements. However, not all e-government projects 
that face ineffectiveness at some point also suffer from project 
escalation. The ability and willingness to change an ineffective course 
of action seems to determine whether a project potentially escalates or 
not.  
 
This chapter presents a case study of an e-government project for 
which it was recognised that flexibility would be needed to remain 
effective. With an approach specifically designed for continuous 
monitoring and adaptation it proved effective in preventing project 
escalation. With the insights on how escalation unfolds presented in 
95 
 
the previous chapter, the investigation of this case provides 
instrumental insights for addressing the research question: 
 
Ø What practices diminish the likelihood of e-government project 
escalation? 
 
 
Theory	  
This study builds on escalation of commitment theory and 
contingency theory, by proposing that there are certain contingencies 
that drive the emergence of project escalation, and that if the 
likelihood of these contingencies is diminished, the likelihood of 
project escalation is diminished. Specifically, there are contingencies 
that contribute to likelihood of e-government project escalation by 
driving ineffectiveness of a course of action and there are other 
contingencies that contribute to the likelihood of e-government 
project escalation by driving commitment to a course of action.  
 
The findings of chapter 2 also suggest that all e-government projects 
are faced with ineffectiveness at some point, driven by technical 
complexity, problems of adoption, conflict between stakeholders, 
problems of communication and coordination, and changing or new 
requirements. Although such contingencies can be managed to some 
extent, ineffectiveness cannot be prevented entirely. The key to 
prevention of project escalation is therefore sought in practices that 
diminish the likelihood of contingencies that drive commitment to a 
course of action. According to the findings of chapter 2 these are sunk 
cost effect, completion effect, information asymmetry, self-
justification, and optimism and risk-seeking biases. The main premise 
underlying the theoretical framework of this chapter is that, unlike 
96  
contingencies that drive ineffectiveness, certain practices can prevent 
these contingencies from arising in e-government projects. Doing so 
will mean that commitment remains low and decision makers are 
more able and willing to adapt ineffective courses of action. This 
makes it possible to avoid e-government project escalation. 
	  
	  
Theoretical	  framework	  
Following the aforementioned line of reasoning, the theoretical 
framework for this study is constructed and depicted in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Theoretical framework for prevention of e-government project 
escalation 
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Method	  
Within this chapter a single case study is presented. This method has 
been identified as appropriate, when the investigated case represents a 
critical case in testing a well-formulated theory (Yin, 2009). As the 
theoretical framework presented for this study builds on well-defined 
escalation theory, which was further validated and informed in the 
study of chapter 2, this condition is met for the study at hand. 
 
A critical case study should be an acceptable real-life example of the 
circumstances in which the theoretical propositions need to be 
investigated. Project O was an e-government project where escalation 
was prevented, despite several project contingencies emerging over 
the course of the project and necessitating adaptation to stay effective. 
The approach for this project was specifically designed to adapt the 
course of action if results, or lack thereof, required. This approach, 
called Agile Scrum, might therefore hold practices that permit 
circumvention of commitment to a course of action, thereby making 
project O a suitable case for further exploration based on the 
theoretical framework for prevention of (e-government) project 
escalation. 
 
Data collection 
 
To perform the case study, data was collected with regard to project 
O. Seven semi-structured interviews were conducted with key project 
staff members and stakeholders. Extensive documentation was 
collected from ten different sources, totalling 79 A4 pages with 
information specifically on the approach and process of the project. 
An overview of the data collected is shown in Table 10. An extended 
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interview guide that added the questions shown in Appendix 2 was 
used to collect data for the research at hand. 
 
Case Interview count 
(total hours) 
Document count 
(total pages) 
Project O 7 (7 h.) 10 (79 p.) 
 
Table 10 – Data collected 
 
Analysis 
 
Similar to the study in chapter 2, the general analytical strategy for the 
critical case study relies on a combination of theoretical propositions 
and the development of a case description. This involves the 
development of a descriptive framework to organise and understand 
the research subject (Yin, 2009). In this case, the aim was understand 
a project approach that was aimed at the flexibility to adapt the course 
of action when it would be ineffective. This approach could 
potentially hold practices that are effective in circumventing 
commitment to the course of action. Descriptive studies have been 
identified as a suitable approach for answering ‘what’ research 
questions (Blumberg, Cooper, & Schindler, 2005).  
 
Based on the basic characteristics of the project and the theoretical 
framework for this study, the descriptive framework is as follows: 
 
1. Context 
2. Objectives 
3. Approach 
4. Project results 
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More specifically, two analytical techniques were applied to the 
objective of the study. First, pattern matching was used to investigate 
the plausibility of the proposed theoretical framework for the 
prevention of e-government project escalation (Figure 6). Second, it is 
investigated where the theory can be extended from the data, in areas 
where more understanding is still needed. In this study, this was done 
with respect to the practices that are effective in diminishing the 
likelihood of contingencies that drive commitment. For extending 
theory, a critical case study has also been identified as an appropriate 
method (Yin, 2009). The case study analysis that follows from this is 
hereafter presented, organised according to the descriptive framework. 
 
	  
Context	  
The context of project O was a government-to-citizen (G2C) service 
that was delivered via a wide range of semi-government institutions. 
The responsible ministry funds these institutions and funding is 
administratively handled by a specially assigned agency. The amount 
of funding that each institution receives is dependent on two criteria: 
the number of citizens using the service via that particular institution 
and the outcome of the service delivery. 
 
The funding agency was charged with implementing a different way 
of identification within the funding process, as dictated by newly 
issued legislation. However, the information systems within the 
agency were becoming out-dated which made them increasingly 
unsuitable for such a change and future improvements. It was 
therefore desirable to combine the legislative implementation with a 
modernisation of the internal information systems. 
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“The initial motive was legislative trajectory with regard to funding […]. 
That motive was soon enough no longer the driving force to continue 
with the project in the years past.” 
Key project staff member 1 
 
 
The funding process was a subprocess of the overall administrative 
process for the delivery of the G2C service, which also included the 
processing of citizen’s applications for the service, and institutional 
registration of the users of the service, and service delivery outcomes. 
The overall process thus involved different forms of data exchange 
between citizens, institutions, and the agency. Traditionally, these 
exchanges were separate, batch-based, and largely manually 
processed data streams. This had a number of drawbacks, including 
the necessity for citizens to provide the same information multiple 
times and long processing times of batches of data that delayed the 
funding process.  
 
“The preceding process […] was a batch-based process, which involved a 
lot of manual data exchange.” 
Key project staff member 2 
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When the affected institutions were approached by the agency to 
cooperate in the legislative implementation, as this required some 
changes on their part too, they demanded that the entire process be 
modernised to overcome these drawbacks. The agency, recognizing 
that this could significantly increase the support and buy-in of the 
institutions for the legislative implementation and modernisation of 
the information landscape, agreed to include this in the effort. Project 
O was born. 
 
“So we this is what we presented to the [institutions]: ‘This is your 
process, and we want to modernise it.’ And their first reaction was: 
‘That’s all very nice, but also very driven from [the agency]. [W]e are not 
really benefiting […]. We want to add something.” So that became the 
deal, as to say.”  
Key project staff member 3 
	  
	  
Objectives	  
With initiation, the objective of project O was threefold: 
 
1. Implement the new way of identification within the funding 
process; 
2. Modernise the internal information systems of the agency, based 
on central information registers; 
3. Establish fully automated, real-time, case-based, 24/7 available 
data exchange between the institutions, citizens and the central 
information registers within the agency. 
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With regard to the third objective, a choice was made to facilitate data 
exchange through a data broker that was already set up and active on 
behalf of the institutions in centrally collecting and delivering 
application data of citizens. Instead of having a separate structure for 
real-time data exchange between the institutions and the agency for 
the funding process, it was decided that all data streams would use the 
existing data broker. 
 
The institutions claimed that one of the most valuable improvements, 
in terms of reducing administrative burden, was to automatically 
collect information from the central register of the agency when a 
citizen filled out an application. This way the citizen would no longer 
need to manually supply information that was already available with 
the agency and the institutions would no longer need to subsequently 
check this manually supplied information with the agency. Therefore, 
it was decided that the focus of the new fully automated, real-time, 
case-based, 24/7 data exchange would be on the application process. 
 
The scope of project O, in terms of objectives, is depicted in Figure 7. 
The intended result of the project was to have a two-way, automated, 
real-time data exchange between institutions and the agency for the 
funding process and a one-way data stream from a central agency 
register to citizens for the application process. The automated data 
stream from the citizen to the institutions was already present as was 
the data-broker facilitating. In the case of the exchange between the 
institutions and the agency, data regarding the number of citizens 
using the service and service outcomes would stream towards the 
agency and data regarding the funding to be received would stream 
the other way. All data-streams would be fully automated, real-time, 
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case-based, available 24/7, make use of the new identification as 
determined in the new legislation, and flow through the data broker. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Project O scope 
 
	  
Approach	  
Partly fuelled by difficulties encountered in previous large-scale e-
government projects, the agency, being the lead organisation in 
project O, decided to follow a significantly different approach for the 
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governance and realisation of the project. This approach is called 
Agile Scrum. 
 
An important difference in Agile Scrum, when compared to 
traditional approaches to the governance and realisation of IT 
projects, is the way that product delivery is organised. Traditional 
approaches typically follow a phased project setup that starts with 
analysis, design, development, testing, and ends with the release of a 
complete product at the end of the project. Agile Scrums involves the 
same cycle, but condenses it into two to four week periods called 
sprints. In a sprint, the full cycle is completed for an increment of the 
complete product, making it possible to start delivery of working and 
thus deployable functionality in a matter of weeks. These cycles are 
repeated until sufficient cycles have been performed to deliver an 
acceptable overall product. An essential condition in this approach is 
that, although it is only a part of the complete product, each increment 
should be deployable and yield business value regardless of future 
sprints. 
 
To support fast and continuous product delivery, it is not attempted in 
the Agile Scrum approach to prespecify all requirements of the 
complete product. Instead, a dynamic list of requirements, called a 
backlog, is used. The backlog is prioritised, with the most 
immediately desired functionality at the top of the list. A selection of 
functionality that would fit into a sprint and result in a valuable and 
deployable product increment is then made from the top of the 
backlog. At the end of each sprint, the delivered product increment is 
demonstrated as a form of progress reporting and to check product fit 
with stakeholder expectations and other circumstances. The resulting 
feedback is processed to update the backlog and define the next sprint. 
Also, a review session called a retrospective is held to reflect on 
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potential improvements in the course of action for the next sprint. As 
such, each sprint not only forms a product delivery cycle, but also a 
feedback and adjustment cycle. 
 
To be able to deliver a deployable product increment in the relatively 
short timeframe of a sprint, all required disciplines (analysis, design, 
development, testing) collaborate in a multi-disciplinary team. In this 
way it is possible to specify the requirements for the product 
increment, make a technical design, and develop and test the 
subsequent software in a parallel and more efficient process. To 
reduce the need for time-consuming documented handovers, the team 
is co-located. This also ensures direct interaction and alignment by 
permitting at least one short coordinative team session, called a daily 
stand-up. 
 
The described Agile Scrum process, including the backlog and a 
sprint selection of functionality as in the input, the sprint cycle with 
the daily stand-up, and a deployable product increment as the 
outcome, is visually depicted in Figure 8. 
 
Project O applied sprints of four weeks in length. During the sprints, 
six multidisciplinary Scrum teams worked simultaneously on the 
same selected functionality from the backlog in the sprint. Three 
teams worked to complete the functionality on the agency side, two 
on the institution side, and one on the side of the data broker. 
Together, these teams designed their products and planned their 
activities for each sprint in a joint forum, which was called the 
working group. Two project managers were responsible for 
coordinating and synchronising the activities of the six teams. 
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Figure 8 – Agile Scrum process 
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“Every four weeks we would gather [and] we would discuss the 
functionalities that would be in the next sprint. […] We would then part 
and develop that. […] And within four weeks we had everything 
integrated on an external environment, where [the users] had access after 
those four weeks to see what had been made.” 
Key project staff member 3 
 
 
In parallel with the planning of sprints by the working group each four 
weeks, the results of the previous sprint were demonstrated to a group 
of representatives of the stakeholder organisations. This group, called 
the project group, consisted of expert members from the stakeholder 
organisations and it was mandated to populate and prioritise the 
backlog, validate sprint planning, and accept the products of each 
sprint. The project group thus directed incremental product delivery 
from the user or business perspective, a role known as product 
ownership. 
 
“So the [Scrum teams] continuously and simultaneously made software 
in four weeks that would make it possible to do something in the process. 
[…] And this way we expanded.” 
Key project staff member 2 
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In the case of Project O, the project group prioritised to start with the 
technically most challenging and therefore riskiest part of the product, 
which was establishing the facilities for real-time data-exchange. 
After that, increments would be delivered in order of highest added 
business value. Each increment was released in a synchronised copy 
of the production environment, so that there could be a live 
assessment that the delivered product increment functioned properly 
within the production context. After a determined period, differing in 
length between two and six months, the accumulation of delivered 
product increments would be integrally tested by user teams and 
released in the actual production environment upon acceptance. Since 
each increment was already delivered in a live copy of the production 
environment at an earlier stage and tested at that point by the project 
teams, no significant issues were ever found in user tests conducted 
before release to the real production environment.  
 
“The first items that we were to deliver were the most riskiest, but also 
had the most business value.” 
Key project staff member 3 
 
 
For planning, project O used a method based on point estimates of the 
effort required to complete each remaining requirement on the 
backlog. These so-called ‘story points’ were used to estimate the 
relative effort size of each requirement and the project quickly learned 
what their ‘velocity’ was in each sprint. That is, after a few sprints the 
teams exhibited stable productivity in the number of story points they 
could complete in a sprint. This knowledge helped significantly for 
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planning because the team could accurately calculate how many story 
points they expected to still complete within the remaining sprints of 
the project schedule. This urged the project group to constantly assess 
priorities in the backlog, and even to place certain requirements 
deliberately outside of the scope if there were more story points 
remaining on the backlog than could be completed in the remaining 
sprints.  
 
“And continuously people were aware: ‘This is the backlog. We’re 
processing this many points per sprint. We have so much time left in the 
schedule. So this will be in and this will fall out.’ […] So that discussion 
was done by [the users] themselves. Because the end date, that was really 
fixed at some point.”  
Key project staff member 2 
 
 
The project group was mandated to act as a product owner by an 
executive management team. This team was called the governance 
platform, and consisted of senior executives of all stakeholder 
organisations. The governance platform held quarterly meetings to be 
informed about the progress by a programme manager they had 
appointed, and whom was chairing the project group meetings. The 
governance platform had the authority to make decisions with regard 
to issues in high-level scope and planning, including budget and 
schedule. To ensure that no such issues would be overseen on the 
level of the governance platform, an independent reviewer was also 
hired to do continuous audits on the state of the project. 
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“We had the governance platform, as we called it. The master plan, that 
held the process steps that we would modernise, we had agreed upon with 
the executives. […] They understood that it was important that they were 
involved in case they had to redirect.” 
Key project staff member 1 
  
 
The entire organisational structure of project O, aimed at governance 
in accordance with the Agile Scrum approach, is depicted in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 – Project O organisational structure 
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Project	  results	  
Project O succeeded at completing its objectives within the intended 
schedule, and without any significant quality issues. The budget had 
been extended with a little less than fifty percent, mainly because of a 
deliberate choice to ‘buy’ additional sprints to develop additional 
functionality that accommodated legislation that was introduced 
halfway through the project. Ironically, this functionality was later 
withdrawn, requiring even more sprints, because the new legislation 
was cancelled. The project had thus adjusted to institutional 
contingencies too quickly. The resulting stats for project O are shown 
in Table 11. 
 
Project run time 3 years 
Index of initial budget 
consumed by the project 
1.49 
Outcome Completed 
 
Table 11 – Project O overview 
 
Because of the specific organisational setup of project O, the 
aforementioned additional sprints could be taken up within the same 
time schedule by maintaining some Scrum teams that would otherwise 
have been disbanded. The independent reviewer officially stated that 
although there was budget extension, the motivations were legitimate 
and the delivery date was not compromised. In the case of project O, 
the processes that the new system supported were subject to a fixed 
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yearly cycle and thus the delivery date was considered a more 
important governance criterion than budget. 
 
“The realisation of [project O] in terms of the backlog has to deal with 
overruns. The reasons for this […] are legitimate and also the go-live date 
is not at risk.”  
Audit report 
 
 
Project O was not only considered a success in terms of the well-
functioning and timely delivered product. It was also considered to 
have two important additional benefits. Firstly, it had significantly 
improved the level of trust and cooperation between the ministry, the 
agency, and the institutions. Secondly, the effectiveness of the Agile 
Scrum approach was acknowledged to have a positive effect on 
governance and a reduction in escalation risk. The approach would 
therefore also be applied in future e-government developments in this 
domain. 
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“[The system of Project O] has been taken into production without any 
significant problems and in time. The enthusiasm about the technical 
possibilities of [the system] is so high that also other [domains] will 
connect. The approach for collaboration between the partners […] will 
also be continued in the future development and maintenance of [the new 
system].”  
Press article 
 
	  
Discussion	  
The data of the case study of Project O supported the plausibility of 
the theoretical framework, while extending it with insights on 
practices that seem to be effective in diminishing the likelihood of 
sunk cost effect, self-justification, optimism and risk seeking biases, 
completion effect and information asymmetry. 
 
The data could be matched with the theoretical proposition that some 
level of ineffectiveness is typical for all e-government projects. One 
of the contingencies that caused project O to be less effective was a 
change in requirements. New legislation was issued during the project 
that would affect the system. As the legislation was still under design, 
the governance platform assigned additional resources to expand the 
scope with functionality needed to accommodate the future 
implementation of the new legislation.  In this case however, this 
decision eventually implied even more ineffectiveness, because the 
introduction of the new legislation was later cancelled, while the 
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project already had developed the necessary functionality. The 
informants stated they learned from this to wait for the latest possible 
moment in subsequent initiatives, before adapting to new legislation. 
 
Technical complexity was another contingency that led to 
ineffectiveness of the course of action in project O. Existing systems 
with which the project O system needed to interact within the 
information system landscape proved to be instable. This was 
identified and lacking maintenance had to be taken care of first. 
 
“[The agency] of course doesn’t exist only out of [the project O system]. 
[It] was highly dependent of the system landscape and the stability of it. 
[…] So with the ‘Scrumming’, they wanted to show the result at the end 
of the month, but they continuously couldn’t connect to one of those 
[other systems]. Because that system was down once again. And because 
those systems were increasingly interdependent, it became necessary the 
system landscape would also be organised properly.” 
Key project staff member 1 
 
 
The findings also supported the plausibility of the theoretical 
framework by showcasing that some practices indeed seem to 
diminish the likelihood of contingencies that drive commitment to the 
course of action and, as a result, the project was able to circumvent 
commitment and adapt its course of action whenever it had become 
ineffective to prevent project escalation. By uncovering some of these 
practices, the data provided some potential extensions of the 
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theoretical framework. This leads to the following theoretical 
propositions, which are open to further validation. 
 
TP3.1 Delivering progress information and independently valuable 
product increments as early and frequent as possible in a 
project diminishes the likelihood of contingencies that drive 
commitment through high stakes, such as self-justification, 
sunk-cost effect, or risk-seeking bias.  
 
With short-cycled, incremental product delivery, the pressure to 
justify previous investments or decisions, or engage in risky 
behaviour with regard to prospective gains or losses is much lower 
because continuation decisions are made earlier, more frequently, and 
thus at moments when the stakes involved are generally much lower. 
 
Furthermore, the need to justify earlier investments with future 
investments is less salient when these investments are already 
valuable. As such, the likelihood of sunk-cost effect, self-justification 
and risk-seeking bias were effectively diminished within the approach 
of project O. This is significantly different from traditional 
development methods, which typically follow a phased approach of 
analysis, design, development, testing, and release and in which all 
business value is delivered at the end of the project in the release 
phase. 
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Figure 10 – Difference in business value delivery 
 
The difference between traditional approaches and the agile approach 
applied in project O with regard to the timing of business value 
delivery is visually depicted in Figure 10. 
 
TP3.2 A short-cycled feedback loop, involving tangible and 
demonstrable results every four weeks, diminishes the 
likelihood of contingencies that promote commitment through 
lack or distortion of information, such information asymmetry, 
optimism bias, or completion effect.  
 
Information asymmetry, optimism bias and completion effect were 
unlikely in project O, as executive authority was appointed to staff 
that was highly involved in the realisation of the project. These 
project staff members, mainly positioned within the so-called project 
team, were informed at least every four weeks of progress and 
potential issues, in the form of live product demonstrations. The 
demonstrations provided unambiguous feedback, reducing the 
TIME 
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likelihood of missing essential progress information, having an overly 
optimistic view of project feasibility, or an incorrect perception of the 
expected date of project completion.  
 
As an additional assurance with regard to clear and unambiguous 
feedback, the executive platform had arranged continuous 
independent reviewing and demanded regular reporting from their 
mandated representatives in the project group, making it even more 
unlikely that any vital information would be missed in the project’s 
governance. 
 
“Collaboration between partners, aligning [every four weeks] on: 
• Processes 
• Functional aspects 
• Technical aspects 
• Planning” 
Project presentation 
 
 
In contrast to the approach of project O, visibility to the executive 
organisation in traditional development is high in the beginning of the 
project, as the analysis phase involves the gathering of system 
requirements from users and stakeholders. In the subsequent phases of 
design and development, visibility is rather low until the testing phase 
when users are presented with a product for acceptance testing. This 
characteristic of traditional development was described as the 
‘submarine-effect’ by one of the informants of project T presented in 
chapter 2. A project submerging in a long period of design and 
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development, out of sight of the executive organisation, can be seen as 
a form of information asymmetry. Potential issues, such as a lack of 
fit between the product and user expectations are not identified until a 
late stage of the project, when stakes and thus commitment are 
already too high to redirect. 
 
The difference between the agile approach of project O and more 
traditional approaches in terms of visibility is depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 – Difference in visibility 
 
 
Concluding, the findings of the study presented in this chapter suggest 
that e-government project escalation can be prevented by diminishing 
the likelihood of contingencies that drive commitment to a certain 
course of action. As it is supported that even successful, non-
escalating e-government projects will be faced with contingencies that 
TIME 
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have a negative effect on project effectiveness, it is by circumventing 
commitment that a course of action can be adapted when challenges 
arise. In some cases, this adaptation might demand termination of a 
project.  
 
The findings also bring forward some insights on what practices may 
be effective in diminishing the likelihood of contingencies that drive 
commitment as discussed. First, early and frequent delivery of 
business value through incremental and iterative development may 
prove effective in diminishing the likelihood of contingencies that are 
related to rationalisation of continuation based on high stakes (sunk 
cost effect, self-justification, risk-seeking bias).  
 
Second, short-cycled and relatively unambiguous feedback through 
live product demonstrations and closely involved business 
representatives may be useful in increasing visibility of the project 
effectiveness, and as such diminishing the likelihood of contingencies 
that are related to lack of accurate information (information 
asymmetry, completion effect and optimism bias). 
 
In some cases e-government projects are beyond the point that they 
can prevent project escalation by applying the practices discussed in 
this chapter. In those cases, project escalation has already occurred 
and decision makers are better served with a deeper understanding of 
tactics that are effective to de-escalate the project. However, the 
environment of e-government projects can be highly politicised, 
implying that de-escalation in e-government projects may be 
somewhat unique. Therefore, understanding effective de-escalation 
tactics in a highly politicised environment is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter	  4 Escaping	  the	  Storm:	  Project	  	  
De-­‐escalation	  in	  a	  Highly	  Politicised	  
Environment	  
 
“More research is needed to develop strategies and tactics to align and 
integrate project members with the new course of action during the 
de-escalation process. [P]eople have almost an uncanny ability to bias 
facts in the direction of previously accepted beliefs and preferences, 
and failure to align and integrate project members’ attitudes towards 
the new course of action could lead to a political battle between those 
who are substantially involved in the escalation episode and those that 
advocate project termination or redirection.”  
 
(Pan, Pan, & Flynn, 2004) 
 
 
Introduction	  
For an escalated project to be de-escalated, commitment to the failing 
course of action needs to be lowered in order for abandonment or 
redirection to become viable options for decision makers 
(Montealegre & Keil, 2000). However, if these decision makers are 
actors in a politically charged environment, de-escalation can have 
significant personal implications and it may therefore be particularly 
challenging in those cases. It has been recognised that e-government 
projects are generally undertaken in such complex political 
environments (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1986; Heeks R. , 2006; 
Heintze & Bretschneider, 2000; Yildiz, 2007). 
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The study at hand makes use of a rare opportunity to gain insight in 
the political processes during e-government project escalation and de-
escalation in a revelatory case. It is therefore applied to address the 
following research question: 
 
Ø How can project escalation be exited (de-escalation) in a highly 
politicised environment? 
 
To set the stage for this study, more light will be shed first on what 
constitutes a politicised environment. Furthermore, some theoretical 
background will be provided on the process of de-escalation. 
 
 
Theory	  
Political theory 
 
Although the definition of what constitutes ‘politics’ has been subject 
of debate since ancient times (Sartori, 1973), one commonly used 
definition today is that politics involve intentional acts of influence to 
enhance or protect the self-interest of individuals or groups (Allen, 
Madison, Porter, Renwick, & Mayes, 1979). In general, politics is 
practiced to obtain values as deference, safety or income for oneself 
or one’s reference group (Laswell, 1939). It has been identified, for 
example, that in case of unsuccessful projects, organisational politics 
can enable managers to gain protection for their careers (Grimland, 
Vigoda-Gadot, & Baruch, 2012). A politicised environment can be 
defined as an environment with a high relevance and salience of 
politics. 
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The executive responsibility for e-government projects generally rests 
with top-level bureaucrats. Both politicians and agency superiors hold 
discretionary power over the careers of these bureaucrats. As such, it 
has been recognised that top-level bureaucrats are enmeshed in 
politics, both on the level of the elected officials and the agency 
(McGregor, 1974). To enhance or protect their career interests when 
responsible for e-government projects, top-level bureaucrats can apply 
several political tactics including attacking or blaming others, 
strategic use of information, image building, ingratiation, 
formation/alignment with power coalitions, associating with 
influential stakeholders, and reciprocity (Allen, Madison, Porter, 
Renwick, & Mayes, 1979). 
 
Some of these tactics are reactive and typically applied in face of 
negative outcomes, such as e-government project escalation. For 
example, attacking or blaming others involves the political actor 
reactively or proactively avoiding the association with undesirable 
results by pointing blame to others for the outcome. Also, the use of 
information might be applied by withholding information that might 
be detrimental to self-interest, such as negative project feedback. 
 
De-escalation theory 
 
The concept of project de-escalation is defined as the outcome of the 
escalation process by reducing commitment to the failing course of 
action, which is manifested by either termination or redirection of the 
project (Montealegre & Keil, 2000; Mähring & Keil, 2008). 
 
In escalation of commitment theory, it is generally accepted that 
project de-escalation is not an instant event but an emergent process, 
similar to project escalation. The project de-escalation process has 
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been characterized as a sequence of stages that proceed from problem 
recognition, re-examination of prior courses of action, search for 
alternative courses of action to the implementation of an exit strategy 
(Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Other researchers have portrayed the 
process as consisting of sequential unfreezing, changing, and 
refreezing of commitment (Pan G. , Pan, Newman, & Flynn, 2006). 
 
Which is common in de-escalation theory is the recognition that it is a 
process. This process involves at least the lowering of commitment 
through certain events or tactics and subsequent corrective action. The 
process of project de-escalation is triggered when decision makers 
weigh-off the attributes that encourage persistence and attributes that 
encourage abandonment (or redirection), and they shift from putting 
more weight on persistence to putting more weight on abandonment 
or redirection. This perspective is the approach-avoidance theory, 
which is compatible with the dominant theoretical explanations for 
escalation of commitment, such as self-justification theory, prospect 
theory and agency theory (Pan, Pan, & Newman, 2009). 
 
De-escalation tactics are deliberate actions aimed at shifting the 
balance from persistence towards abandonment or redirection. Tactics 
identified in the literature include changes in top management, 
identification of alternatives, regular evaluations, unambiguous 
feedback, improvement of organisational tolerance for failure, and de-
institutionalisation of the project (Keil M. , 1995a; Montealegre & 
Keil, 2000; Pan, Pan, & Flynn, 2004). From an approach-avoidance 
perspective, some of these tactics seem to make logical sense when 
related to the contingencies driving commitment to a failing course of 
action that were identified in the study in chapter 2. For example, 
unambiguous feedback may be effective if commitment is driven by 
information asymmetry. Likewise, if commitment is driven by self-
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justification, it will probably be effective if an actor that is untainted 
by previous decisions replaces the self-justifying decision maker. 
More relationships that can be made between drivers of commitment 
and de-escalation tactics from the literature are shown in Table 12. 
 
Contingency driving 
commitment 
Potential de-escalation tactics 
Information 
asymmetry, completion 
effect and optimism 
bias 
Ø Unambiguously negative feedback (Garland, 
Sandefur & Rogers, 1990, Snow & Keil, 2002, 
Heng, Tan & Wei, 2003b) 
Ø Regular evaluation of the project (Drummond, 
1995, Keil & Robey, 1999) 
Ø Early warning systems (Montealegre & Keil, 
2000) 
Ø Accuracy in project status reporting (Snow & 
Keil, 2002)  
Ø Greater receptivity to bad news (Montealegre 
& Keil, 2000) 
Self-justification Ø Separation of responsibility for initiating and 
evaluating projects (Keil & Robey, 1999, 
Newman & Sabherwal 1996) 
Ø Changes in top management or project 
championship (Keil, 1995a, Ross & Staw, 
1993) 
Ø Increasing organisational tolerance for failure 
(Keil & Robey, 1999, Heng, Tan & Wei, 
2003a, Newman & Sabherwal, 1996, Snow & 
Keil, 2002) 
Ø Making negative outcomes less threatening 
(Keil & Robey, 1999, Simonsen & Staw, 1992 
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Sunk-cost effect, and 
risk-seeking bias 
Ø Publicly stated limits (Brockner, Shaw & 
Rubin, 1979, Heath, 1995, Keil & Robey, 
1999, Simonsen & Staw, 1992) 
Ø Setting minimum target levels  (Keil & 
Robey, 1999, Simonsen & Staw, 1992)  
Ø Visibility of project costs (Brockner, Shaw & 
Rubin, 1979, Montealegre & Keil, 2000) 
Ø Availability of alternative investments (Keil, 
Mixon, Saarinen & Tuunainen, 1995, McCain, 
1986, Montealegre & Keil, 2000) 
 
Table 12 – Contingencies driving commitment and potential de-escalation 
tactics 
 
What hasn’t been explicity recognised in the literature, however, is 
the role of the political environment in de-escalation. As such, little 
theory as yet exists on how political interests may be aligned towards 
a new course of action, and as such how to effectively de-escalate a 
project in a highly politicised environment. It has been recognised that 
more research is needed in this particular area (Pan, Pan, & Flynn, 
2004). 
 
This study applies existing knowledge of both political and de-
escalation theory, to understand how an escalated e-government 
project was de-escalated in a highly politicised environment, in order 
to arrive at proposition that may extend the theory in this specific 
area. 
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Method	  
The study in this chapter is a single, explanatory case study. It has 
been put forward that ‘how’ and ‘why’ question have a more 
explanatory nature, and likely to lead to the use of case studies (Yin, 
2009).  
 
The case study addressed a so-called revelatory case, which has been 
acknowledged as valid rationale for a single case study. A revelatory 
case comprises a situation where the investigator has the opportunity 
to observe and analyse a phenomenon, which is rarely accessible to 
scientific research (Yin, 2009). As the political interests of actors 
involved in escalated e-government projects are often conflicting with 
public interests, and therefore can damage careers even in retrospect, 
information in this regard is rarely disclosed. However, during the 
course of investigation, one of the informants (key project staff 
member 1) of a particular case, project T, felt confident enough to 
open up due to the confidential nature of the interviews. As such, the 
opportunity to investigate the political objectives and tactics applied 
in a severely escalated e-government project arose largely 
coincidental during the data collection process.  
 
Data collection 
 
During two hours of semi-structured interviewing of one of the 
informants for the study presented in chapter 2, this informant 
disclosed quite extensively on the political objectives and tactics that 
played a role in the escalation and de-escalation of the e-government 
project they had been involved in. This happened in response to the 
‘what happened next and why’-question in the interview script. The 
investigator responded by asking the informant to elaborate on these 
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remarks. To extend and increase the reliability the data, triangulation 
of the account was done with the accounts of the other informants of 
this case and with documentary evidence collected for the case. This 
is known as converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 2009). 
 
Analysis 
 
The general analytical strategy applied to structure and make sense of 
the retrieved data, was to develop a case description with regard to the 
political environment and the role it played in the de-escalation 
process of project T. The descriptive framework that was developed to 
accommodate this was the following: 
 
1. Context 
2. Political values 
3. De-escalation tactics 
4. Outcome 
 
The specific analytical technique was that of explanation building. 
This procedure is specifically relevant for explanatory case studies, as 
the objective of this technique is to build an explanation about a case. 
A common way to apply the technique is by generating theoretical 
propositions that make sense of the processes and outcomes of the 
case. This is the technique of choice in the study at hand; the aim of 
the analysis is to arrive at theoretical propositions, logically following 
from the case description in the aforementioned framework, that help 
to explain how the project was de-escalated given its highly 
politicised environment. 
 
To increase the validity of the inferences made from the data through 
the described analysis, two independent referees were asked to assess 
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whether the raw data indeed reflected the inferences made in the case 
description and discussion. The inferences were only valid if both 
referees supported the analysis of the data as done by the researcher. 
The referees were the same as those who did the assessment for the 
study in chapter 2. 
 
 
Context	  
As described in chapter 2, Project T was originally aimed at replacing 
legacy back office systems of a government agency, but objectives of 
the project shifted towards implementation of functionality for new 
legislation during execution and later towards only the stabilisation of 
part of this functionality. The change of requirements and problems 
with innovative technology had driven the project into an ineffective 
course of action. Moreover, lack of accurate information on the 
problems followed by optimism bias, self-justification, and sunk-costs 
led key decision makers to sustain an ineffective course of action for 
four-and-a-half years. The damage of this escalation of commitment 
was that almost twice the original budget was depleted with only 
marginal results. 
 
Initiation of the de-escalation of project T was the result of an 
intervention by an independent reviewer hired to review the project 
and advise the project executive as it went ahead. Replacing a 
colleague, the reviewer started his assessment of the project three-
and-a-half years after the project was initiated. In the first months of 
his assignment, the problems with the project’s realisation mounted 
with a number of bad releases. The reviewer therefore started to raise 
concerns, advising the project executive to redirect the project’s 
course of action significantly. 
130  
 
It became clear to the reviewer that there was a significant reluctance 
to redirect or terminate the project due to a number of political 
impediments associated with de-escalation primarily for the project 
executive. For example, the project executive seemed to not want to 
accept any negative feedback that was given. Such feedback was 
dismissed with a strong but unfounded belief that the course of action 
would eventually be successful. 
 
“And then [the reviewer] said, and also wrote down: ‘If I were you, I 
would start worrying and re-direct.’ […] And their reaction was: 
‘They’re saying that it is going better now, so first have another look.” 
Key project staff member 1 
 
 
As the problems endured and rationalisations for continuation lost 
their credibility, the project executive realized that something had to 
be changed, as the course of action would not become successful by 
itself. However, the political impediments were still in place. Hence, 
the reviewer devised a strategy for de-escalation that involved 
deliberate tactics to overcome the political impediments. 
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 “Then [the reviewer] said: ‘I still see some light, but we need to take 
some important measures. […]’ And then in the following week, in a 
couple of sessions, we discussed it further: ‘How should we proceed? 
What needs to happen now?” 
Key project staff member 1 
	  
	  
Political	  values	  
As mentioned, political acts are intentional acts of influence to 
enhance or protect values of self-interest. Such values may be 
classified as deference, safety, or income (Laswell, 1939). From the 
case data it can be inferred that professional reputation, or prestige, 
was the primary value the project executive obtained through his role 
and acts of influence in Project T. Professional reputation, which 
would be classified as a form of deference, is a value that could 
enhance the project executive’s career. As such, it would likely also 
indirectly lead to enhanced income. It was recognized that the project 
executive intentionally associated himself with the project and 
positioned himself as a change champion. He was indeed credited for 
his role as such and managed to raise political support and funds for 
the project because other stakeholders felt they would benefit from the 
project through the enhanced reputation it would give to the entire 
organisation. 
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“[I]t was really the project of the project executive, who had raised the 
money for it in The Hague. And that was extraordinarily cunning and 
good, that he recognised that the legacy had to be replaced and that he 
invested in the organisation. That was an outstanding feat by [the 
executive].” 
Key project staff member 1 
 “[T]here were and still are people within [the organisation] who say: 
‘This must become a beautiful system, which will have the potential 
to deliver future benefits for us as an organisation. Or a future 
strategic position. If we do this well, we will be able to take over 
pieces of this and this agency or we can arrange it splendidly for the 
entire State.’” 
Key project staff member 1 
 “[The project executive] had been the great advocate of the project, 
also internally. He had always said: ‘I’m the executive and I will 
ensure that it will go well. […] I’m completely behind this and it will 
be a big success.’ So within his own organisation, [the project 
executive] was the figurehead of the project, because ‘this is our 
future’. And also externally.” 
Key project staff member 1 
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As the problems of the ineffective course of action became 
increasingly clear and rationalisations were losing credibility, the 
political objective for the project executive shifted from enhancing 
towards protecting the value of professional reputation. If the 
problems would become visible to organisational superiors and public 
officials, it would pose a significant threat to the executive’s 
professional reputation and subsequently his career prospects. 
Therefore, the executive’s interest to protect his professional 
reputation from the threat of public association with the 
ineffectiveness of the project formed a serious impediment to de-
escalation. 
 
“There are two things you will have to do when you terminate the 
project; you will have to say to your superiors ‘the money is gone’ or 
‘we’re going to do something completely different, maybe it’s not 
gone, but we still have a huge problem’.” 
 
Key project staff member 1 
 “If you look at [the project executive], he has a drive, but he also put 
a lot of his prestige in this project.” 
 
Key project staff member 1 
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 “We were getting into a situation, that we were afraid that [our 
superiors], but also within Parliament questions would start to be 
raised: ‘Why is [the project] still not completed?’” 
 
Key project staff member 2 
“[We were afraid] that we would get questions. That we would get 
into trouble. ‘What did this cost us? Why did it take so long?’ […] I 
think we were lucky that there were too many other projects that were 
going wrong, in all honesty. That’s the way it works in the end. So 
that can create a lot of trouble.” 
Key project staff member 2 
	  
	  
De-­‐escalation	  tactics	  
To overcome the political impediments to de-escalation, a number of 
de-escalation tactics were sequentially applied. 
 
Unambiguous negative feedback 
 
The first tactic that played a crucial role in the de-escalation of project 
T was the unambiguous negative feedback delivered by the 
independent reviewer with regard to the state and prospects of the 
project and its approach. It took some time for the reviewer to obtain 
sufficient recognition for his concerns. Until that moment, the project 
executive had been primarily dependent upon feedback from the 
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project organisation itself, which was mostly optimistically biased. 
Furthermore, because of the need to justify earlier decisions, the 
project executive did not want to accept any negative feedback that 
was given.  
 
“So [the reviewer] looked for another month and had some more 
talks. Then [he] came back and said […]: ‘Sorry, but it has not 
become better. I’m still not convinced. You will not be able to make 
this work.” 
Key project staff member 1 
 
 
The independent reviewer needed to give negative feedback over a 
longer period of time and gain support from senior project associates 
to eventually convince the project executive that the course of action 
was ineffective. The acknowledgement by the project executive that 
the course of action would not lead to desired results was an essential 
condition for other de-escalation tactics to become viable. As such, 
unambiguous negative feedback was the first step towards de-
escalation in the highly politicised environment of project T. 
 
“And then we were sitting with [the executive], and [the senior project 
associate] said: ‘[I] think [the reviewer] is right. We’re not going to 
pull this off. Something is really wrong here.’ 
Key project staff member 1 
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“Well, when the [senior project associates] came clean, [the project 
executive] understood that he could not hold his position.” 
Key project staff member 1 
 
 
Making negative outcomes less threatening 
 
Although the project executive acknowledged that the course of action 
was failing, termination or redirection remained an unviable option 
for him because of the political implications that this would have. The 
second de-escalation tactic was therefore to make the negative 
outcome less threatening by doing two things. 
 
First, an alternative course of action was investigated for feasibility in 
a very short timeframe, which would salvage at least part of the value 
that the project should have delivered; operationalization of the main 
part of the new legislation. Applying a development method that was 
especially suitable for fast delivery of results, called Agile Scrum, met 
this need. This alternative had the potential of delivering a minimally 
viable result within a relatively short time frame and for acceptable 
additional costs. The functionality developed so far would be 
consolidated as much as possible. The executive board decided to 
organise a Proof of Concept that would run for no longer than two 
months. The Proof of Concept was a success and the negative 
outcome of de-escalation became somewhat less threatening because 
there was an alternative course of action. 
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“And than we agreed on a Proof of Concept […]. A sort of very basic 
system. To replace.” 
Key project staff member 2 
“[Now] we had trust in the foundation. So in terms of the architecture, 
the way of working, those kinds of things. And that was an important 
turning point for us.” 
Key project staff member 2 
 
 
Second, impression management was applied to create a public image 
that the project had succeeded. To do this, the emphasis in official 
communication was on the results obtained with the alternative course 
of action. The results that were not obtained, legacy replacement and 
full implementation of the new legislation, and the much higher costs 
were downplayed or obscured. One deliberate action to support this 
image was to end the project as if it had been completed. 
 
 
“[W]hat happened was that, with the state-level attention to big e-
government projects, the executive organisation wanted to remain 
under the radar.”  
Key project staff member 1 
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“And the original goal of the project was the complete replacement of 
the legacy. That goal we simply never achieved. We said at a certain 
moment: ‘[…] Now we will only deliver a number of parts still under 
the name of [project T]. And now we’re going to put a thick stripe 
through the name [project T]. Because that name is heavily tainted.’” 
Key project staff member 2 
“The only thing of political importance was [the new legislation]. 
That is a new law, with commitments towards Parliament, so that has 
to go ahead. […] What you see often is that the first elements get most 
attention, also in terms of PR. So that was extensively celebrated 
within [the agency].” 
Key project staff member 2 
 “[Project T] was completed [six years after initiation]. 
Parliamentary documentation 
 
 
Withholding and distorting information 
 
So now the project executive had recognised the ineffectiveness of the 
course of action and had an alternative course of action that could 
create an impression that the project was a success. A final de-
escalation tactic was needed to ensure that the actual problems that the 
project had encountered would not be uncovered. This tactic was to 
withhold or distort any information that could make visible the real 
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reasons that project T had consumed twice the original budget to 
deliver only partial results and prevent association of the project 
executive with this negative outcome. 
 
A number of things stand out with regard to the official information 
concerning the outcome of project T. First, any questions related to 
why the project consumed twice the initial budget were answered by 
suggesting this was due to the changes in project scope. In this way, 
responsibility for the budget overrun was placed outside the direct 
control of the project executive team. 
 
“[Project T has] overrun in costs, due to in between changes in the 
scope of the project.” 
Parliamentary documentation 
 “The increase in costs of [Project T] can be attributed to expansion of 
the scope of the project.” 
Parliamentary documentation 
 
 
Second, questions with regard to the incompleteness of the results of 
the project, another undeniable fact, were countered with evasiveness. 
Either the response was not really an answer to the question or in the 
response it was suggested that the replacement of the legacy was 
actually part of regular operations rather than an objective of project 
T. 
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“Why is the new system only being used for [the new legislation]? 
 
[Project T] delivers a system according to ‘Service Oriented 
Architecture’ (SOA). Part of this architecture (‘services’) is already 
being used to replace parts of existing systems […].  Furthermore, 
with the realisation of the different parts for [the new legislation] a 
foundation has been laid for further replacement of existing systems.” 
Parliamentary documentation 
“The old systems will be replaced gradually over the coming years. 
This will happen in an organic fashion, in which parts of the old 
systems will gradually be replaced by new ‘services’. Replacing the 
old systems is part of our own project portfolio and as such will be 
funded from the regular operational budget of [the executive 
organisation].” 
Parliamentary documentation 
	  
	  
Outcome	  
The outcome of the sequence of de-escalation tactics described was 
that the project was indeed was de-escalated, despite the highly 
politicised environment, and it was subsequently terminated with 
partial results. At that point, 193% of the initial budget had been 
consumed. Nonetheless, and this was considered by those involved to 
be perhaps the biggest success, those responsible for the project had 
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managed to terminate the project with minimum damage to their 
professional reputations.  
 
“Much smaller projects have come in publicity much bigger than this 
one. So that was a success.” 
Key project staff member 2 
 
 
Another interesting outcome of the de-escalation process was that 
independent auditing concluded that although there had been 
challenges, the project could not be criticized for lacking control. As 
such, the official documentation conveys a message that resembles: 
‘although the patient is deceased, the surgery was successful.’ 
 
“[The auditor] concludes that [the executive organisation] has taken 
sufficient measures to be in control of [project T]. 
Parliamentary documentation 
“[The auditor] closes with the finding that [the executive organisation] 
has taken steps for a better governance of projects, but that it is 
challenging to find a balance between ambitions, resources, and 
time.” 
Parliamentary documentation 
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Discussion	  
The de-escalation of project T in a highly politicised environment can 
be modelled as a process, as it is depicted in Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 12 - De-escalation process project T 
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From the findings with regard to the de-escalation process in the 
highly politicised environment of project T, a number of theoretical 
propositions can be generated. First, for any other de-escalation tactics 
to be applied, unambiguous negative feedback has to ensure that the 
ineffectiveness of the course of action and the need to act is 
recognised by the key decision maker. 
 
TP4.1 Unambiguous negative feedback with regard to the 
effectiveness of the course of action is an essential tactic to be 
able to initiate any other de-escalation tactics in a highly 
politicised environment. 
 
Second, the case evidence seemed to point at the protection of the 
professional reputation and career prospects of the project executive 
as the primary political value, once the problem of e-government 
project escalation was identified. De-escalation tactics have to 
consider this value in order to be effective. 
 
TP4.2 De-escalation tactics in highly politicised environments should 
reflect the most important political values of key decision 
makers in order to be effective.  
 
TP4.3 Protecting the professional reputation and career prospects of 
decision makers responsible for the project, is the primary 
political value in the situation of an escalating e-government 
project. 
 
Project T showed that the professional reputation and career prospects 
of the project executive could be protected by finding a way that the 
project executive could be associated with success rather than failure. 
Two tactics were applied effectively to this end. First, a partial result 
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was obtained in short time, ensuring some value from the project and 
thereby creating an impression that the project was successful. 
Second, any information that could suggest otherwise and thus 
associate the project executive with failure rather than success was 
withheld or distorted. This leads to the following two theoretical 
propositions. 
 
TP4.4 Finding a way to create some value from a project in a short 
time, and subsequently creating the impression that the project 
is a success based on this partial result, is an effective de-
escalation tactic in highly politicised environments. 
 
TP4.5 Creating an impression that a project is a success while it only 
delivered partial results is only an effective de-escalation 
tactic in a highly politicised environment if the information on 
the true problems and outcomes of the project is withheld or 
distorted. 
 
The propositions based on the case study at hand show remarkable 
consistency with a case study of the Denver airport baggage handling 
system project (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). In this study, the 
researchers also proposed that in the de-escalation process it is first 
necessary that problems are recognised and subsequently that a new 
course of action needs to be identified and legitimised. Development 
of a new course of action explicitly involved the managing of 
impression, as a way to avoid embarrassment for political actors 
before an exit strategy could be implemented.  
 
This study feeds into existing understanding of the project de-
escalation process, as was the objective of this dissertation. It did so 
by validating existing notions of this process, but also by providing 
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more profound insights into political manoevering and the political 
values involved in the e-government context. 
 
The aim of the next chapter is to conclude on the research question by 
aggregating the findings of this chapter with those of chapters 2 and 3. 
Furthermore, limitations of the entire study and recommendations for 
future research will be discussed. 
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Chapter	  5 Towards	  Better	  Theory	  on	  the	  Governance	  of	  E-­‐
government	  Projects	  
 
“When riding a dead horse, the best strategy is to dismount” 
 
Dakota Indian proverb 
 
 
The consolidation of the findings and theoretical propositions put 
forward by this research provides a process model as depicted in 
Figure 13. As such, this process model forms a plausible answer to the 
research question. 
 
Taking a process perspective, this study suggests that an e-
government project is unlikely to be effective over the entire course of 
the project. It is whether the level of commitment to the chosen course 
of action is high that determines if the process of e-government 
project escalation will unfold, when the course of action becomes 
ineffective in any way. Both contingencies in e-government projects 
that can drive ineffectiveness and commitment to the course of action 
have been identified as part of this conclusion. 
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Figure 13 – Process model for e-gov. project escalation 
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Technical complexity, problems of adoption, problems of 
coordination and communication, changing requirments and conflict 
between stakeholders are likely to be relevant contingencies for 
ineffectiveness of the course of action in e-government projects, 
consistent with previous work in the project risk literature (Bekkers & 
Homburg, 2007; Cats-Baril & Thompson, 1995; Cerpa & Verner, 
2009; Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005; Lee & Kim, 2007; Tsai, Choi, & 
Perry, 2009). The model proposed here further finds that these 
contingencies tend to be differentially salient in different stages of the 
e-government project escalation process. Technical complexity, 
problems of adoption, problems of coordination and communication 
and changing requirements tend to trigger trouble early in the process. 
Later in the process, attempted remedies only result in more 
ineffectiveness as stakeholders get into a state of conflict and the 
remedies only result in more technical problems and adoption issues. 
 
The escalation phases of Mähring and Keil (2008) constitute an 
empirically plausible structure for understanding how the e-
government project escalation process unfolds. This study brought 
forward an extension of this theoretical model, by suggesting that 
different contingencies can add to ineffectiveness or commitment to 
ineffective courses of action and that different contingencies can be 
become salient in different phases of the escalation process. That is, 
the findings suggest that commitment in the drift phase of the 
escalation process is mostly an unconscious phenomenon driven by 
information asymmetry and it is subsequent lack of awareness of the 
presence of problems that results in a course of action remaining 
unaltered. This part of the model builds on existing notions of the role 
of information asymmetry in the project escalation process (Keil, Rai, 
Mann, & Cheney Zhang, 2003; Ross & Staw, 1993). As the escalation 
process moves into subsequent phases, commitment becomes more 
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consciously driven, first through biased decision making and later 
through conditions that are used to rationalise continuation. Here, the 
model incorporates insights from previous studies on project 
escalation with regard to the roles of optimism, risk-seeking biases, 
sunk-cost effect, completion effect and self-justification (Brockner, 
1992; Guah, 2008; Keil, 1995a; Keil 1995b). 
 
It was also suggested in this study that certain practices are effective 
in preventing e-government project escalation. The identified 
practices are incremental development and short-cycled unambiguous 
feedback. These are suggested to provide earlier and better feedback 
to decision makers, reducing the likelihood of information asymmetry 
and decision-making biases. As such, these practices would also be 
effective in reducing the likelihood of contingencies used to 
rationalise continuation, as the escalation process will be exited a 
priori, before these contingencies can become salient. 
 
Finally, the research presented a revelatory case study, which 
uncovered the politicised environment of escalating e-government 
projects, and how the political values in this environment form 
impediments to de-escalation. This study brought the proposition that 
de-escalation tactics in e-government projects should reflect the 
political values of interest to key decision makers in order to be 
effective. Based on the notion that the protection of professional 
reputation and career prospects is a particularly important political 
value in escalating e-government projects, a process model was 
provided with a plausibly effective de-escalation strategy in the highly 
politicised environment of such projects. 
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Implications	  for	  practice	  
The propositions and models put forward in this study provide 
practitioners with potentially highly valuable insights on how to 
recognise, understand, prevent or exit e-government project 
escalation. Mähring and Keil (2008) suggested that the seeds of 
escalation are sown early. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that 
it is the lack of accurate information about ineffectiveness in the drift 
phase, and the subsequent failure to recognise that the course of action 
needs to be adapted, that sets the stage for escalation.  
 
There was a call in the literature for more research on the e-
government project escalation process, in order to prevent 
perpetuating previous mistakes and maximize gains while minimizing 
resources spent (Yildiz, 2007). This research has made an effort in 
answering that call. It provides practitioners with insights that are 
empirically supported, on how to forestall and proactively address 
project escalation. This includes not only asking ‘what will determine 
the effectiveness of my project?’ when initiating an e-government 
project, but also asking ‘how will we identify any ineffectiveness 
quickly and ensure that we will be able and willing to redirect or 
terminate the project when that happens?’  
 
In cases of escalated projects, an ineffective course of action was 
allowed to endure until so much was invested that re-direction or 
termination had become an unviable option for decision makers. The 
findings suggested that this was possible because of information 
asymmetry in an early phase of the escalation process, resulting in a 
situation where different motivations for continuation became salient 
in a later phase. Practitioners can learn from this that project 
escalation can be prevented by early and continuous feedback with 
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regard to the effectiveness of the course of action, and facilitating 
swift and decisive adaptation of the course of action when it becomes 
ineffective. Short feedback loops and the ability to adapt can be 
supported by certain development methods, like Agile Scrum, and by 
securing independent project review since suppliers often have 
incentives to withhold certain information. 
 
Also, this research has exposed some of the political values involved 
in escalated e-government projects, which may form context-specific 
impediments to de-escalation. As the revelatory case project T 
showed, practitioners may need to engage in de-escalation tactics that 
are effective to overcome such impediments, but are questionable 
from an ethical point of view. That is, de-escalation may require a 
trade-off between being fully transparent and honest, and doing what 
is most effective to protect the public interest when spending large 
amounts of public resources. This research has shown that 
practitioners can leverage small successes to obscure big mistakes in 
decision-making, and that this may be necessary to protect the 
professional reputations and career prospects of those responsible for 
the e-government project escalation episode. This makes a point to 
reflect on how to evaluate decision makers that acknowledge previous 
mistakes by redirecting or terminating ineffective e-government 
projects, both by their political superiors and in the public eye. Should 
they be punished for previous mistakes, or respected for having the 
courage to admit them and not letting them grow into bigger 
problems? In the light of this question, the famous English poet and 
moralist Samuel Johnson once rightfully stated that those who can be 
blamed for the fewest faults are usually those who are willing to admit 
them the quickest. 
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Limitations	  and	  recommendations	  for	  future	  research	  
Some limitations of this study also need to be addressed. The first and 
foremost is related to the use of case study research aimed primarily at 
theory development and proportionally theory validation. Applying 
this method, the study relies on analytic generalizability. Unlike 
statistical generalizability, which means generalising the findings of a 
statistically analysed sample to be representative for each other case 
in the whole population or universe, analytic generalizability means 
that the research findings are generalised to expand or develop theory 
(Yin, 2009). This implies that the findings cannot be generalised to 
the entire population of e-government projects or the larger population 
of IT projects without recognizing the particularities of each case in 
the population. That is, the theoretical propositions may not be 
equally valid in all situations. For example, incremental development 
may not always be able to deliver on its merits with regard to early 
value delivery or adaptability. Anyone applying the theoretical 
framework of this study in practice should therefore acknowledge and 
accommodate the specificities of the project to which it is applied. 
 
Based on the aforementioned limitation, an opportunity for further 
research is to subject the theoretical propositions of this study to more 
intensive empirical validation to strengthen their generalizability. 
Especially statistical research can contribute to assess the 
generalizability of the theory to different populations, like the entire 
population of e-government projects, the entire population of IT 
projects, or even the entire population of complex projects. Statistical 
validation can also be valuable to specify rather than to generalize. 
For example, does it matter whether an e-government project is G2G 
or G2C for the validity of the theoretical propositions? 
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Another limitation that needs to be noted was that the research 
findings are bound to a specific context. The research focussed 
specifically on IT projects in the Dutch government context. 
However, the particularly high incidence of project escalation and the 
level of public interest within this specific context justified the 
research in terms of relevance. This was supported by the fact that in 
2013 the Dutch government formed a parliamentary commission to 
investigate the problem of failing e-government projects in the 
Netherlands. This commission presented their findings in 2014 and 
these included an observation that even within this specific context 
escalation is a sizable problem. Estimates of the amount of resources 
lost on failing e-government projects in the Netherlands range from 
two to five billion Euros pro annum. 
 
The limitation of context specificity nonetheless provides the 
opportunity to investigate the applicability of the theory presented in 
this research to other contexts. For example, do the theoretical 
propositions hold in non-IT government projects, or in non-
government IT-projects? Moreover, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether the theoretical framework can be used to construct 
a predictive model. This would involve the investigation of a larger 
sample, stratified on the parameters in the theoretical propositions of 
this study and observe whether this leads to consistency in the 
predicted escalation outcomes.  
 
One specific area that this study explored might also be an interesting 
vein for future research. Practices of Agile Scrum were proposed as 
effective in diminishing the likelihood of escalating commitment. 
Hence, it would be of interest to see if this can be further validated to 
test, for example, whether there are situations where these practices 
will not be effective in the proposed way and if these practices can be 
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applied in projects without using the Agile Scrum methodology. 
Moreover, it would be of some value to try to better understand if 
there are other practices that have similar potential? 
 
The aforementioned limitations and recommendations are not 
considered to be exhaustive. German writer and statesman Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe once said that admitting ones limitations is 
what brings one closest to perfection. I therefore hope that this study 
contributes to our understanding of the governance of complex 
projects not only by the theory it put forth, but also (and perhaps even 
more so) by its limitations, including those that I did not yet identify 
here. 
155 
 
References	  
 
Ahn, M. J., & Bretschneider, S. (2011). Politics of E-Government: E-
Government and the Political Control of Bureaucracy. Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 71 , 414-424. 
Aldrich, D., Bertot, J. C., & McClure, C. R. (2002). E-Government: 
initiatives, developments, and issues. Government Information 
Quarterly, Vol. 19, Issue 4 , 349-355. 
Algemene Rekenkamer. (2007). Lessen uit ICT-projecten bij de 
overheid - Deel A. Den Haag: Algemene Rekenkamer. 
Allen, R., Madison, D., Porter, L., Renwick, P., & Mayes, B. (1979). 
Organizational Politics - Tactics and Characteristics of Its Actors. 
California Management Review , 22 (1), 77-83. 
Asgarkhani, M. (2005). Digital government and its effectiveness in 
public management reform. Public Management Review, Vol. 7, Issue 
3 , 465-487. 
Azad, B., & Faraj, S. (2008). Making e-Government systems 
workable: Exploring the evolution of frames. Journal of Strategic 
Information Systems 17 , 75–98. 
Bekkers, V., & Homburg, V. (2007). The Myths of E-Government: 
Looking Beyond the Assumptions of a New and Better Government. 
The Information Society, Vol. 23, Issue 5 , 373-382. 
Beynon-Davies, P. (2005). Constructing electronic government: the 
case of the UK inland revenue. International Journal of Information 
Management, Vol. 25, Issue 1 , 3-20. 
Blumberg, B., Cooper, D., & Schindler, P. (2005). Business Research 
Methods. London: McGraw Hill. 
156  
Bowen, M. G. (1987). The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered: 
Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors? Academy ol Managemenl 
Review, Vol. 12, Issue 1 , 52-66. 
Bozeman, B., & Bretschneider, S. (1986). Public Management 
Information Systems: Theory and Prescription. Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 46 , 475-487. 
Bretschneider, S. (1990). Management Information Systems in Public 
and Private Organizations: An Empirical Test. Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 50, Issue 5 , 536-545. 
Brockner, J. (1992). The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing 
Course of Action: Toward Theoretical Progress. Academy of 
Management Review , 17 (1), 39-61. 
Brockner, J., Shaw, M., & Rubin, J. (1979). Factors affecting 
withdrawal from an escalating conflict: quitting before it’s too late. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 15, 492-503. 
Brown, D. (2005). Electronic government and public administration. 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol 71(2) , 241–254. 
Brown, M., O'Toole, L., & Brudney, J. (1998). Implementing 
Information Technology in Government: An Empirical Assessment of 
the Role of Local Partnerships. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, No. 4 , 499-525. 
Cats-Baril, W., & Thompson, R. (1995). Managing Information 
Technology Projects in the Public Sector. Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 55, No. 6 , 559-566. 
Cerpa, N., & Verner, J. (2009). Why Did Your Project Fail? 
Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery, Vol. 
59, No. 12 , 130-134. 
157 
 
Chan, C. M., Hackney, R., Pan, S. L., & Chou, T.-C. (2011). 
Managing e-Government system implementation: a resource 
enactment perspective. European Journal of Information Systems, 
Vol. 20, Issue 5 , 529-541. 
Cordella, A., & Ianacci, F. (2010). Information systems in the public 
sector: The e-Government enactment framework. The Journal of 
Strategic Information Systems, Vol. 19, Issue 1 , 52-66. 
Cule, P., Schmidt, R., Lyytinen, K., & Keil, M. (2000). Strategies for 
Heading Off IS Project Failure. Information Systems Management , 1-
9. 
Dawes, S. S. (1996). Interagency information sharing: Expected 
benefits, manageable risks. Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, Vol. 15, Issue 3 , 377-394. 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review , 48 (2), 147-
160. 
Doty, P., & Erdelez, S. (2002). Information micro-practices in Texas 
rural courts: methods and issues for e-government. Government 
Information Quarterly, Vol. 19, Issue 4 , 369-387. 
Drummond, H. (1995). De-escalation in Decision Making: A Case of 
Disastrous Partnership. Journal of Management Studies , 32 (3), 265-
281. 
Edmiston, K. D. (2003). State And Local E-Government: Prospects 
and Challenges. The American Review of Public Administration, Vol. 
33, Issue 1 , 20-45. 
Fedorowicz, J., Gogan, J. L., & Williams, C. B. (2007). A 
collaborative network for first responders: Lessons from the CapWIN 
case. Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 24, Issue 4 , 785-807. 
158  
Fountain, J. E. (2001). Building the virtual state: information 
technology and institutional change. Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Frank, R., & Bernanke, B. (2001). Principles of Economics. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Galbraith, J. R. (1973). Designing complex organizations. Boston: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Garland, H., Sandefur, C., & Rogers, A. (1990). De-Escalation of 
Commitment in Oil Exploration: When Sunk Cost and Negative 
Feedback Coincide. Journal of Applied Psychology , 75 (6), 721-727. 
Gascó, M. (2003). New Technologies and Institutional Change in 
Public Administration. Social Science Computer Review, Vol. 21 No. 
1 , 6-14. 
Gil-Garcia, J. R., & Pardo, T. A. (2005). E-government success 
factors: Mapping practical tools to theoretical foundations. 
Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 22, Issue 2 , 187-216. 
Goldfinch, S. (2007). Pessimism, Computer Failure, and Information 
Systems Development in the Public Sector. Public Administration 
Review, September , 917-929. 
Gonzalez, R., Gasco, J., & Llopis, J. (2007). E-government success: 
some principles from a Spanish case study. Industrial Management & 
Data Systems, Vol. 107, Issue 6 , 845-861. 
Gresov, C. (1987). Exploring Misfit with Multiple Contingencies. 
Administrative Science Quarterly , 34 (3), 431-453. 
Grimland, S., Vigoda-Gadot, E., & Baruch, Y. (2012). Career 
attitudes and success of managers: the impact of chance event, 
protean, and traditional careers. The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management , 23 (6), 1074-1094. 
159 
 
Guah, M. W. (2008). IT project escalation: A case analysis within the 
UK NHS. International Journal of Information Management, Vol. 28 , 
536–540. 
Hairul, M., Nasir, N., & Sahibuddin, S. (2011). Critical success 
factors for software projects : A comparative study. Scientific 
Research and Essays , 6, 2174-2186. 
Heath, C. (1995). Escalation and deescalation of commitment in 
response to sunk costs: the role of budgeting in mental accounting. 
Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes , 62 (1), 
38–54. 
Heeks, R. (2006). Implementing and Managing eGovernment. 
London: Sage Publications. 
Heeks, R., & Stanforth, C. (2007). Understanding e-Government 
project trajectories from an actor-network perspective. European 
Journal of Information Systems , 16 (2), 165-177. 
Heintze, T., & Bretschneider, S. (2000). Information Technology and 
Restructuring in Public Organizations: Does Adoption of Information 
Technology Affect Organizational Structures, Communications, and 
Decision Making? Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, Vol. 10, Issue 4 , 801 -830. 
Heng, T., Tan, B., & Wei, K. (2003a). De-escalation of commitment 
in software projects: Who matters? What matters? Information & 
Management , 41 (1), 99-110. 
Heng, T., Tan, B., & Wei, K. (2003b). Willingness to continue with 
software projects: effects of feedback direction and optimism under 
high and low accountability conditions. Journal of Association for 
Information Systems , 4 (4), 171-194. 
160  
Jaeger, P. T. (2003). The endless wire: e-government as global 
phenomenon. Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 20, Issue 4 , 
323-331. 
Jun, K.-N., & Weare, C. (2011). Institutional Motivations in the 
Adoption of Innovations: The Case of E-Government. Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 21, Issue 3 , 495 -
519. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of 
decision under risk. Econometrica , 47 (2), 263-291. 
Keil, M. (1995a). Pulling the Plug: Software Project Management and 
the Problem of Project Escalation. MIS Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 , 
421-447. 
Keil, M. (1995b). The effects of sunk cost and project completion on 
information technology project escalation. IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management , 42 (4), 372 - 381. 
Keil, M., & Robey, D. (1999). Turning Around Troubled Software 
Projects: An Exploratory Study of the Deescalation of Commitment to 
Failing Courses of Action. Journal of Management Information 
Systems , 15 (4), 63-87. 
Keil, M., Mixon, R., Saarinen, T., & Tuunainen, V. (1995). 
Understanding Runaway Information Technology Projects: Results 
from an International Research Program Based on Escalation Theory. 
Journal of Management Information Systems , 11 (3), 678-87. 
Keil, M., Rai, A., Mann, J. E., & Cheney Zhang, G. P. (2003). Why 
Software Projects Escalate: The Importance of Project Management 
Constructs. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management , 50 (3), 
251-261. 
Kezar, A. (2003). Transformational Elite Interviews: Principles and 
Problems. Qualitative Inquiry , 9, 395-415. 
161 
 
Kim, H. J., Pan, G., & Pan, S. L. (2007). Managing IT-enabled 
transformation in the public sector: A case study on e-government in 
South Korea. Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 24, Issue 2 , 
338-352. 
Kim, S., & Kim, D. (2003). South Korean Public Officials' 
Perceptions of Values, Failure, and Consequences of Failure in E-
Government Leadership. Public Performance & Management Review, 
Vol. 26, Issue 4 , 360-375. 
Kim, S., Kim, H. J., & Lee, H. (2009). An institutional analysis of an 
e-government system for anti-corruption: The case of OPEN. 
Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 26, Issue 1 , 42-50. 
Kromann Kristensen, J., & Bühler, B. (2001). The Hidden Threat to 
E-Government - Avoiding large government IT failures. OECD. 
Ku, G. (2008). Learning to De-escalate: The Effects of Regret in 
Escalation of Commitment. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes (105), 221-232. 
Laswell, H. D. (1939). Politics - Who Gets What, When, How. 
Gloucester, USA: Peter Smith Pub. Inc. 
Layne, K., & Lee, J. (2001). Developing fully functional E-
government: A four stage model. Government Information Quarterly, 
Vol. 18, Issue 2 , 122-136. 
Lee, J., & Kim, J. (2007). Grounded theory analysis of e-government 
initiatives: Exploring perceptions of government authorities. 
Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 24, Issue 1 , 135-147. 
Lee, J., Keil, M., & Kasi, V. (2012). The Effect of an Initial Budget 
and Schedule Goal on Software Project Escalation. Journal of 
Management Information Systems , 29 (1), 53-78. 
162  
Luna-Reyes, L. F., Zhang, J., Gil-García, R. J., & Cresswell, A. M. 
(2005). Information systems development as emergent socio-technical 
change: a practice approach. European Journal of Information 
Systems, Vol. 14, Issue 1 , 93-105. 
Mähring, M., & Keil, M. (2008). Information Technology Project 
Escalation: A Process Model. Decision Sciences, Volume 39, Number 
2 , 239-272. 
McCain, B. (1986). Continuing investment under conditions of 
failure: a laboratory study of the limits to escalation. Journal of 
Applied Psychology , 71 (2), 280–284. 
McGregor, E. B. (1974). Politics and the Career Mobility of 
Bureaucrats. The American Political Science Review , 68 (1), 18-26. 
McLellan, E., MacQueen, K. M., & Neidig, J. L. (2003). Beyond the 
Qualitative Interview: Data Preparation and Transcription. Field 
Methods , 15, 63-84. 
Mohr, L. B. (1982). Explaining organizational behavior. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Montealegre, R., & Keil, M. (2000). De-escalating information 
technology projects: lessons form the Denver international airport. 
MIS Quarterly, Vol 24 , 417-447. 
Moon, M. J. (2002). The Evolution of E‐Government among 
Municipalities: Rhetoric or Reality? Public Administration Review, 
Vol. 62, Issue 4 , 424-433. 
Myers, M. D., & Newman, M. (2007). The qualitative interview in IS 
research: Examining the craft. Information and Organization , 17, 2-
26. 
163 
 
Newman, M., & Sabherwal, R. (1996). Determinants of commitment 
to information systems development: a longitudinal investigation. MIS 
Quarterly , 20 (1), 23-54. 
Nour, M. A., AbdelRahman, A. A., & Fadlalla, A. (2008). A context-
based integrative framework for e-government initiatives. 
Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 25, Issue 3 , 448-461. 
Pan, G. S., Pan, S. L., & Flynn, D. (2004). De-escalation of 
commitment to information systems: a process perspective. Journal of 
Strategic Information Systems, Issue 13 , 247–270. 
Pan, G., Pan, S., & Newman, M. (2009). Managing Information 
Technology Project Escalation and De-Escalation: An Approach-
Avoidance Perspective. IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management , 56 (1), 76-94. 
Pan, G., Pan, S., Newman, M., & Flynn, D. (2006). Escalation and de-
escalation of commitment: a commitment transformation analysis of 
an e-government project. Info Systems J , 3–21. 
Rose, W. R., & Grant, G. G. (2010). Critical issues pertaining to the 
planning and implementation of E-Government initiatives. 
Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 27, Issue 1 , 26-33. 
Ross, J., & Staw, B. (1993). Organizational Escalation and Exit: 
Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. Academy of 
Management Journal , 36 (4), 701-732. 
Sartori, G. (1973). What is "politics"? Political Theory , 1 (1), 5-26. 
Scholl, H., & Klischewski, R. (2007). International Journal of Public 
E-Government Integration and Interoperability : Framing the 
Research Agenda. International Journal of Public Administration , 
30, 889-920. 
164  
Scott, W. R. (1981). Organizations: Rational, natural and open 
systems. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
Simonson, I., & Staw, B. (1992). Deescalation strategies: a 
comparison of techniques for reducing commitment to losing courses 
of action. Journal of Applied Psychology , 77 (4), 419–426. 
Sivanathan, N., Galinsky, A., Ku, G., & Molden, D. (2008). The 
promise and peril of self-affirmation in de-escalation of commitment. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes , 1-14. 
Snow, A., & Keil, M. (2002). The challenge of accurate software 
project status reporting: a two-stage model incorporating status errors 
and reporting bias. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management , 
49 (4), 491-504. 
Staw, B. M., & Ross, J. (1987). Behavior in escalation situations: 
Antecedents, prototypes, and solutions. In B. M. Staw, & L. L. 
Cummings, Research in Organizational Behavior (pp. 39-78). 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Tansey, O. (2007). Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for 
Non-probability Sampling. PS Online , 765-772. 
The Standish Group. (2012). Chaos Manifesto 2012. Boston: The 
Standish Group. 
Tsai, N., Choi, B., & Perry, M. (2009). Improving the process of E-
Government initiative: An in-depth case study of web-based GIS 
implementation. Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 26, Issue 2 , 
368-376. 
Verhoef, C. (2008). Rijks-IT: Bad Practice. Digitaal Bestuur (January 
2008), pp. 49-51. 
Weiss, R. (1995). Learning from Strangers - The Art and Method of 
Qualitative Interview Studies. The Free Press. 
165 
 
Yeo, K. (2002). Critical Failure Factors in Information System 
Projects. International Journal of Project Management , 241-246. 
Yildiz, M. (2007). E-government research: Reviewing the literature, 
limitations, and ways forward. Government Information Quarterly , 
24 (3), 646-665. 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 
Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. 
 
  
166  
Appendix	  
 
Appendix 1 – Interview guide 
Project ID / name: 
Interviewee name(s) and role(s): 
 
 
 
Interviewer: 
Date: 
Start time: 
End time: 
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Introduction 
My name is Niels Groen, I am 28 / 29 years of age and I am a PhD fellow 
in Governance and Policy Analysis at the Maastricht Graduate School of 
Governance.  
I am here today for an interview with you to collect data for my PhD 
research. My research is aimed at understanding the process of e-
government project escalation. Through this interview, my intention is to 
learn about this process from the practical experiences of your project. In 
intend to do this by reconstructing the project’s process and features 
herein that have lead to issues in the realisation and / or obstacles in 
resolving these issues. 
Today, I am the interviewer and you are the interviewee. The interview is 
semi-structured, which means that I have prepared some questions, but 
the purpose is to converse freely. For the purpose of solid retrieval of all 
of the information, this interview will be audio recorded. We will take 
about two hours for the interview. 
Question 1  
Could you please introduce yourself?  
• What are your name, personal and professional background, and 
(former) role in the project? 
Question 2   
Could you please describe the project from beginning to end? Please be 
specific about dates. 
• What was the context, the initial objective(s), rationale, 
stakeholders, approach, planning and results? Please be specific 
about dates. 
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Question 3   
What issues where there in the realisation of the project?  
• Could you please describe the process of how these issues arose 
(what were their causes)? Please be specific about dates of these 
events and the points where additional resources where 
committed (as reflected on Rijks ICT Dashboard). 
• What happened consequently? Was the issue (quickly) resolved 
or did it endure? How come and why? 
Question 4   
Are any important aspects affecting the process of the project that we not 
yet discussed? 
Question 5   
Can you share any documents about the aforementioned? 
Close 
Thank you for your time and sharing your experiences. 
For the purpose of validity, I would like to talk to any other 
knowledgeable informants of the project. Can you suggest any with 
which you can bring me into contact? 
This interview will be transcribed. The transcript will be shared with you 
for your approval, before any information you have given me is used in 
the research. The records and transcripts from the interviews will be 
treated confidentially and any information from it will be made 
anonymous for use in the research and its reports. 
Would you like to receive a copy of the dissertation after its completion? 
Do you have any remaining questions? 
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Appendix 2 – Interview guide extension for chapter 3 
Question 3 ad. 
• How was feedback regarding the effectiveness of the project 
organised? 
• How was ensured that the course of action could be adapted to 
remain effective? 
• What was the effect of this approach on the visibility of progress 
and adaptability? 
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Valorisation	  
On the day that I write this paragraph, news has come out that the 
Dutch Minister of Defence has terminated an e-government project 
with little result, after it had run for 11 years and consumed almost 1 
billion Euros (estimates by the Dutch General Chamber of Auditors). 
Escalation of projects aimed at implementing IT in the public sector 
has been a headache to the policy practice for almost three decades, 
not only in the Netherlands, but also in many other countries, 
including the United States of America, the United Kingdom and 
South Korea. In fact, over the course of this study, a parliamentary 
committee in the Netherlands conducted a research on the on-going 
problems with the effectiveness of e-government projects and wastage 
of public resources involved. I was asked to inform this committee 
based on my research and many of the findings of this study were 
included in the committee’s final report. 
Sometimes governments have to undertake risky initiatives with 
taxpayer’s money, such as e-government projects. This study 
articulates that the specific context of e-government projects make 
them unlikely to go from A to B in a straight line. Many things can 
and will go wrong. There are however practices available regarding 
the governance and management of such initiatives that significantly 
reduce the likelihood that things going wrong will also result in 
massive wastage of public resources. Such practices have been 
proposed by this study. 
Besides implementing proposed practices for the governance and 
management of e-government projects, this study calls for a cultural 
change. As articulated in chapter 4, the current political values in the 
Netherlands favour commitment over re-direction or termination in 
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case of failing e-government projects. It seems that the Dutch 
government has developed a mantra of infallibility. Since no 
organisation is of course in absence of error, this mantra only results 
in hiding or denying failures. This effect is strengthened by an 
eagerness of the public to find scapegoats when failure in government 
is exposed. Unless a culture is grown in which we value those who 
acknowledge failure, taxpayer’s money will continue to be used 
irresponsibly in the development of e-government and in many other 
contexts. 
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Summary	  in	  Dutch	  /	  Samenvatting	  
De toepassingen van Informatie Technologie (IT) zijn niet meer weg 
te denken uit de hedendaagse samenleving. Ook in de publieke sector 
is het belang van IT inmiddels onomstreden; voor het verhogen van de 
effectiviteit van de interne bedrijfsvoering, maar ook van 
communicatie en transacties met burgers, bedrijven en andere 
overheden. 
Ondanks de intuïtieve aantrekkingskracht van e-overheid is de 
implementatie ervan beladen met problemen. IT-projecten, zowel in 
de private als in de publieke sector, worden in het algemeen 
gekenmerkt door een hoge mate van problematische realisatie. Deze 
problematiek komt tot uiting in forse overschrijdingen van budgetten, 
en vaak met slechts gedeeltelijk of zelfs geheel niet het gewenste 
resultaat als uitkomst. 
Ondanks dat gebrek aan beheersbaarheid van IT-projecten niet 
exclusief toebehoort aan de publieke sector, zijn het wel de gevallen 
van onbeheersbaar geworden projecten in dit domein die de meeste 
controverse veroorzaken. Een belangrijkere reden is dat publieke IT-
projecten gemiddeld veel omvangrijker zijn in termen van benodigde 
investeringen, en dat de verspilling die geassocieerd is met 
mislukkingen navenant groter is dan in de private sector. 
Er is al veel onderzoek gedaan naar het succes of falen van IT-
projecten, zowel in de publieke als in de private sector. Deze 
onderzoeken zijn voornamelijk gericht geweest op het verklaren van 
variantie in de uitkomst van IT-projecten aan de hand van succes- of 
faalfactoren. Het onderzoek naar succes- en faalfactoren in IT-
projecten heeft echter nog niet geleid tot significante verbeteringen in 
de praktijk. Een verklaring hiervoor is dat het denken in succes- en 
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faalfactoren leidt tot een (te) vereenvoudigd denken over de complexe 
processen van IT-projecten. 
Deze studie is er op gericht een rijker begrip te creëren over hoe 
publieke IT-projecten falen. Hiervoor is een procesbenadering 
gekozen in tegenstelling tot een factorbenadering. Hierbij werd een 
bredere definitie gehanteerd van wanneer het proces van een project 
als succesvol wordt beschouwd. Behalve de zeldzame oplevering 
volgens plan, wordt tijdelijke aanpassing op onvoorziene problemen 
als succes gezien. Dergelijke aanpassing kan betekenen dat het project 
wordt bijgestuurd met het alsnog behalen van de resultaten tegen 
redelijke kosten tot gevolg, of het stopzetten van een project met 
minimale financiële schade. In dit geval is falen dus een proces 
waarbij men onveranderd de originele koers volgt, terwijl het project 
niet de gewenste resultaten levert en het project meer en meer 
middelen consumeert. Dit specifieke proces is bekend als project 
escalatie en wordt gedefinieerd als een situatie waarin beslissers 
volhouden meer middelen te investeren in het project, ondanks 
negatieve feedback over het vermogen van het project om de gewenste 
resultaten te leveren (Brockner J. , 1992; Staw & Ross, 1987). De 
bijbehorende onderzoeksvraag voor deze studie is: 
Ø Hoe verloopt het proces van project escalatie van publieke IT-
projecten? 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden vijf case studies gepresenteerd, drie van 
geëscaleerde projecten en twee van getroebleerde maar tijdig 
bijgestuurde projecten. Deze cases zijn geanalyseerd op 
gebeurtenissen en omstandigheden in het proces die leidden tot een 
ineffectieve projectkoers en gebeurtenissen en omstandigheden die 
leidden tot de neiging om vol te blijven houden in een ineffectieve 
koers. Deze gebeurtenissen en omstandigheden, waarvan vooraf niet 
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met zekerheid kan worden vastgesteld of ze zullen optreden in het 
project, noemen we contingenties. Voorafgaand aan de analyse is een 
synthese gemaakt van elementen uit bestaande studies ten aanzien van 
deze twee type contingenties. Vervolgens is onderzocht of er in de 
cases sprake was van projectescalatie, in de zin dat er een ineffectieve 
koers was waarin men geneigd was vol te houden, en welke 
contingenties hieraan ten grondslag lagen, en in welke fase van het 
proces. Dit leidde tot een aantal proposities.  
De eerste propositie is dat ineffectiviteit in publieke IT-projecten 
wordt veroorzaakt door technische complexiteit, adoptieproblemen, 
conflict tussen belanghebbenden, coördinatie- en 
communicatieproblemen en/of veranderende eisen. Het lijkt 
onwaarschijnlijk dat de omvangrijke en vaak complexe IT-projecten 
van de overheid niet met één of meerdere van deze contingenties te 
maken gaat krijgen tijdens de uitvoering. Wat echter maakt dat 
sommige projecten escaleren en anderen niet, is verwerkt in de tweede 
propositie; publieke IT-projecten escaleren wanneer er sprake is van 
een neiging tot volhouden in een ineffectieve koers door een sunk-
costeffect, voltooïngseffect, zelfrechtvaardiging, informatie-
asymmetrie en/of optimisme en risicozoekend gedrag.  
De analyse liet ook zien dat de genoemde contingenties relevant zijn 
in verschillende fases van het escalatieproces. In de derde, vierde en 
vijfde propositie wordt dan ook gesteld dat contingenties die leiden tot 
ineffectiviteit vooral relevant zijn in de eerste twee fases van het 
escalatie-proces. In de eerste fase van projectescalatie wordt er 
desondanks volgehouden omdat er sprake is van informatie-
asymmetrie; beslissers zijn simpelweg niet op de hoogte dat het 
project ineffectief is en laten het dus door gaan. In daarop volgende 
fasen worden andere contingenties relevant die bijdragen aan de 
neiging tot volhouden. Eerst is er optimisme dat het wel goed komt en 
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men is bereid risico te nemen om geen verlies te hoeven accepteren. 
Later volgt dat beslissers diverse omstandigheden gebruiken om vol te 
houden en dit te rationaliseren. Dit betreft het rechtvaardigen van 
nieuwe investeringen op basis van reeds gemaakte kosten (sunk-
costeffect), het idee dat het project bijna is voltooid (voltooïngseffect) 
en het beschermen van reputatie door niet terug te komen op eerder 
gemaakte beslissingen (zelfrechtvaardiging). 
In hoofdstuk 3 is een case study gepresenteerd van een project waarbij 
een specifieke aanpak was gehanteerd voor snelle feedback en 
frequente mogelijkheid om bij te sturen. Omdat dit project effectief 
bleek in het voorkomen van projectescalatie, is het als een kritieke 
case study gebruikt om theorie te genereren over hoe projectescalatie 
bij publieke IT-projecten te voorkomen. Uit de gestructureerde 
beschrijving van de case komen twee proposities naar voren. De 
eerste propositie is dat een aanpak waarbij het eindresultaat van het 
project incrementeel in korte iteraties wordt opgeleverd, waarbij ieder 
increment al waardevol is, de kans reduceert op volhouden in een 
ineffectieve koers, omdat contingenties die te maken hebben grote 
belangen (sunk-costeffect, zelfrechtvaardiging en risicozoekend 
gedrag) minder waarschijnlijk zijn. Dit komt doordat door de 
beslissingen over continueren frequenter worden genomen en de 
belangen per beslissing nog relatief klein zijn. Bovendien is er na 
iedere succesvolle increment reeds sprake van opgeleverde waarde uit 
het project, waardoor er minder verlies hoeft te worden genomen bij 
bijsturen of stoppen. De tweede propositie is dat in dezelfde aanpak 
sprake is van kortcyclische en betrouwbare feedback over de 
effectiviteit van het project, omdat het gebaseerd is op waarneembare, 
werkende resultaten. Dit verlaagt de waarschijnlijkheid van 
contingenties die leiden tot volhouden in een ineffectieve koers als 
gevolg van onnauwkeurige of ontbrekende informatie 
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(informatieasymmetrie, voltooïngseffect, optimisme) en daarmee de 
kans op projectescalatie. 
Hoofdstuk 4 omvat een onthullende case study die inzicht geeft in de 
politieke motieven die een rol spelen bij de mogelijkheid tot de-
escaleren van een publiek IT-project. Aan de hand van de case is een 
procesmodel gepresenteerd hoe een publiek IT-project in deze politiek 
beladen omgeving effectief kan worden gede-escaleerd. Proposities 
die hieruit voortkomen zijn (1) dat het de-escalatieproces dient te 
beginnen met onomstotelijke feedback over de ineffectiviteit van de 
gekozen projectkoers, (2) dat de in het de-escalatieproces rekening 
gehouden dient te worden met het belangrijkste politieke motief in 
deze context, (3) bescherming van persoonlijke reputaties, en (4) dat 
dit mogelijk is door in korte tijd een gedeeltelijk succes te behalen 
met een alternatieve aanpak en hiermee te representeren dat het 
project geslaagd is en (5) informatie die de werkelijkheid over het 
succes van het project weergeeft achter te houden of te verdraaien. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een integraal procesmodel gepresenteerd, waarin 
de bevindingen uit de voorgaande hoofdstukken zijn opgenomen. 
Tevens worden enkele implicaties van de studie behandeld; de 
betekenis die de bevindingen hebben voor hoe publieke IT-projecten 
worden aangepakt en aangestuurd, en de ethische vragen die studie 
oproept. Tot slot worden de limitaties van de studie besproken en 
suggesties gedaan voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
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